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THE ESCAPE FROM POLITICS: POWER IN MIDDLE-SIZED CITIES

by

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1964

PREFACE

The middle class has come to the foreground of the Community Political Scene. In some cases this change has been quite dramatic while in others it has gone quite unnoticed. The older ethnic and lower-class predominance in politics has given way to domination by a newer American, middle-class style. The point of emphasis in political life is no longer that of the loosely-knit ward organization in personal connection to patronage and pecuniary reward. Instead, impersonal and bureaucratic modes of rationalized honesty and efficiency are being increasingly emphasized in the character of city hall politicians, in the professional demands of public service and in the prevailing climate of political ideas. This trend is especially true in the middle-sized communities where the numbers of foreign born and lower-income groups are too small to make their political presence felt.

Depending upon the particular history and social organization of the community, the newer style of politics after coming to power may either gain or lose in strength and degree of institutionalization. In most communities, however, the difference between this newer style and the older one which it supplanted is quite noticeable. Furthermore, whether brought about in 1911 by the activities of a dedicated professional backed by the noblesse oblige of a relatively stable business elite or in 1950 by a group of war veterans reacting to the corrupted image of their town, this more professional orientation toward public power is here to stay.

It is the contention of the present monograph that the change in political style has not affected some deep and all too often recalcitrant modes of political thought in the American community. The preeminent value of occupational advancement in the private economy over the fulfillment of a community's future in public service remains as strong in bureaucratic as it was in "personal"

government. The middle-sized city with a small reservoir of interested business leaders, little professional and voluntary association talent, and few if any articulate minority needs often sinks, after its housekeeping chores are rationalized, into smug satisfaction. The same problems reside on a smaller scale in the middle-sized city as are found in the large metropolis, but there is little or no contention with the prevailing vision of the community as only a place to make a career for oneself and at best to satisfy honestly traditional public needs like police and fire protection or street maintenance.

There is a bias in the present work, a bias toward open and responsible debate about the community's present needs and dedication to a comprehensive view of the future. The ideological undercurrent of this presentation stresses the importance of the value of politics as a way of life and is implicitly critical of a body of community values which undermines public life while extolling the virtues of economic success. If there is hope in the present movement toward "good government", it rests with the construction of a firm body of public-interest ideas and the institutionalization of roles that can apply them to the experience of specific communities.

Although evidence to support the present interpretation is culled, in the main, from the Peoria, Illinois, situation, the general configuration of social groups and values appears also to hold true for Rockford and Springfield, Illinois, and hopefully, for other middle-sized American cities as well. It is somewhat unfortunate that this work uses Peoria to construct a case for community disengagement and the preponderance of a calm, non-conflictual power system, since Springfield and Rockford have been even more tardy in meeting their developmental problems. Peoria has had recurrent civic spirit and involvement and

has exerted much effort to construct more than simply a good-housekeeping government. It has even met its racial residential problems with an open desire for legislative solution. However, the fact that public involvement with future growth, even in Peoria, is in the hands of a few dedicated men of shaky power is perhaps the best proof of the insufficiency of present community support for planned development.

All communities present problems of historical and social particularities that make them somewhat exceptional to any general rule. Therefore, the interpretative emphasis is on those general features of American community life that are similar for all cities of the same basic social structure and historical circumstances. This is not an attempt at a single community study nor even at a single community power study, but uses cases as illustrative of general points that may be useful in the analysis of any middle-sized community.

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CHAPTER 1

The Posture Toward Power

This is a study of power in communities. It attempts to add significant dimensions to the ideas which encompass contemporary conceptions of power. Major emphasis is placed upon comprehension of the idea of power rather than upon "scientific" application of this idea to concrete empirical situations. Whatever propositions of a substantive nature result from this study are the first gropings toward a theory of power in middle-sized cities, but no systematic theory along these lines is attempted here. The conceptions of power are approached at two levels: (1) the way in which social analysts have defined and articulated the problem of power, and (2) the way in which actors in society define what power is and should be.

The problem of understanding the system of power in the community demands a rethinking of the major ideas developed in the study of community power and the reshaping of these conceptions in order to make them consonant with the events and actions discovered in middle-sized cities in Illinois. * Through using this approach, one does not get bogged down in the details of the local community which are irrelevant to a comprehension of the general features of community power, and one may strive for the construction of ideas of sufficient abstraction to understand community power in general and to facilitate the planning of alternative modes of action that can assist any community to solve its developmental problems. The study of power is the study of what conscious or unconscious forces work to retain the essential features of the status quo and to facilitate change. Community power emphasizes how these forces are distributed and organized at the community level.

Power is often thought of as something found only in public bodies or public offices, in city councils, statehouses or the presidency. But power pervades life

* This monograph is one of the parts of a larger study of Peoria, Rockford, and Springfield, Illinois, done by the Office of Community Development at the University of Illinois. Special emphasis in this report is placed upon Peoria case material.

and is an essential element of all human relationships, from the commanding position of parents vis a vis children to the hierarchy of authority in the economic enterprise. The public is significantly affected not only by the power embodied in official political institutions but by unofficial power as well. Any study of community power must emphasize both aspects of this bifurcation of the sources of power. Thus, community power alludes to two basic requirements for study--one, the emphasis on the way in which power fulfills or fails to fulfill actions of public consequence and two, the question of the interplay between official and unofficial power wielding forces.

Concomitant with the problem of power as it affects and is affected by the public is the question of how much power different groups in the community possess. The search for the position of different community groups within a structured power system implies that certain groups exert greater influence than others. The men who, in the community setting, concretely demonstrate that they can, by their decision or lack of decision, set the course of community development derive this capacity from their social position, from the recognition and expectation by the community. Unlike animals whose power is dependent solely on brute force, human beings have power through the inculcation and acceptance of certain things and ideas which are themselves the embodiment of power. Like everything else social, power is enduring and is ruled and regulated by specific limitations. In the human community, even the use of force, which is the final sanction of power, is surrounded by complicated rulings as to its correct applicability. Power is interwoven into the fabric of social relations. It is interconnected with the warp and woof of social groups and organizations. It is not an isolated item found here and there among some individual men and not among others. Individuals possess power because they possess certain things of a kind which other individuals do not possess or because they have positions in

social organizations which most other individuals do not have. Moreover, power, because of its importance to the community, is always found clustered with other things deemed important. If wealth is valued highly in a community, it is inconceivable that power would accrue to indigence. The problem of power is connected to an analysis of the way in which it integrates with other valued things. In discovering how the things which a community values are organized and distributed, one inevitably discerns the structure of power.

Two approaches to the problem of community power have resulted in the growth of divergent "schools" of thought on the matter. Both attempt to discover who has power, how it is structured, and what its processes are in the community. The father of the first approach, Floyd Hunter, has studied Atlanta, Georgia, through a technique known as "repute analysis". By asking people of established repute in the community for a list of power figures and then studying the actions of these figures, he discovered the apex of the Atlanta power structure and the manner of its workings. Countering and attacking Hunter's approach on the grounds that power cannot be studied through repute but only through concrete decisions made by wielders of power is the "issue analysis" approach of Robert Dahl and his
* followers. The pluralists' study of New Haven, Connecticut, analyzed the structure and processes of community power by delineating the actions of persons engaged in concrete community issues. They claim that power can only be understood as it actually works and not as it is said to work by community actors.

The results of these two studies were quite different but do not necessarily reflect substantive distinctions between Atlanta and New Haven in view of the fact that the use of these two approaches in subsequent analyses of other communities has consistently yielded the same kinds of differences. Hunter discovered a co-

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Specialists on community power are well acquainted with the "Hunter-Dahl controversy." For non specialists, see Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1953) and Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1961).

hesive power unit, comprised of a small group of top business-leaders, which made all major community decisions. This economic elite knew each other intimately, was conscious of its power, and was at the apex of an integrated power hierarchy consisting of upper-class decision makers who delegate activities to middle-class "leg men". In this type of power structure, elected political officials are subject to the rulings of the captains of industry and finance and can only be placed in the middle range of the power hierarchy. In contradistinction to this monolith headed by unofficial power, the Dahlists present what they call the "pluralist alternative". They conclude that most people in the community do not utilize power except to forward their interests through acting in specific issue areas. Moreover, different people's interests are stimulated in different issue areas. What is discovered is a plurality of competing interest groups utilizing their power either to forward desires or to buffer threats to their desires. In this system, official political authority is the only enduring role played in all issues, since the government's function appears to be that of legitimate referee *

among competing groups.

The Hunter approach to power suffers from what may be called the "diabolical theory of politics". The idea is common in American folklore that major decisions are often reached behind the backs of the citizenry by a rational and coherent group working in its own interests. If elected authority does not govern, then someone must be pulling strings in the background. Hunter may be substantially correct if his approach is given less of a Machiavellian turn. It is quite possible that an economic elite is at the top of the community power structure but it is not

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A full critical exposition of the Hunter-Dahl controversy in terms of its disciplinary traditions is found in Thomas J. Anton, "Power Pluralism and Local Politics", Administrative Science Quarterly, 7 (March, 1963), 425-457.

necessary that they rationally make powerful decisions. Such a rational organization of non-legitimate power may occur when the advantages that accrue to business are threatened in the community by social groups demanding power for the diminution of business privileges, but this is not often found in American communities. Hunter's outlook is not sensitive to the possibility that men can possess power without being fully aware of its use and without rational application to its possibilities.

Whereas Hunter's shortcomings can be overcome by an awareness of non-rational power, the drawbacks of pluralism are infinitely greater. It eschews the whole tradition of power as an aspect of all social life and attributes it to discrete individuals having little connection to community institutions. In an era when most men live out their daily lives as members of huge and complex organizations, it dares conceive of the community as a disattached array of competing individuals. Except for the governmental organization form, power does not appear to be socially organized. Its use depends upon the rational self interest of each individual claimant in the arena of community issues. If a problem does not arise which touches the individual's particular sphere of interest, he will have no power in this sphere. Since, for Dahl, power is the ability of Individual A to influence Individual B, there is no power except when such individuals interact with each other. As put succinctly by Anton, "pluralist assumptions concerning power begin with a view of society (or community, or any other social unit) as an aggregation of different individuals motivated by self-interest, predominantly rational (in the sense that they are conscious of their interests and active in seeking their fulfillment), and free from any permanent relationships with anyone or anything else."

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* See Appendix A.

** Anton, op. cit., p. 447.

Accent on concrete issues as the exclusive locus of power also individualizes power. If power is present only when individuals are utilizing it in particular issues, then implicitly there is no power when such issue negotiation does not arise. This is an abrogation of the idea of power as an enduring part of all social relationships whether it is being openly used or not. The whole tradition of political science, indeed of common sense itself, is witness to the fact that power can rule without openly passing down rulings. If a king does not issue decrees, does this mean that the monarchy does not reign? Moreover, ignoring the institutionalization of power by emphasizing its presence solely in current issues gives an extremely shallow historical bias to the analysis. Such an approach is like studying the power structure of the state and leaving out the legislature because the study happened to be done when the legislature was not in session. Given the fact that for pluralism power is rooted in individuals rather than in the social roles of enduring social institutions and given the historical and logical arbitrariness of its conception of community issues, it is no surprise that a fragmented power structure is discovered. Moreover, in any city in any year, one is assured of finding a varying roster of decision-makers.

Another serious limitation of the pluralistic viewpoint is its emphasis on an essentially economic model of power. Concomitant with the classical economic conception of society, the community is seen as an aggregate of individuals imbued with relative degrees of rationality and competing in terms of this rationality for a limited supply of goods and services. There need be no overt use of power to control these competing actors except the established rules of contract which set the limits for rational competition. The working of government is viewed as a caretaker over possible rulebreaking, as a sphere which is considered best when working least. The government is the only enduring locus of power and must be curbed lest it interfere with the integration effected by the automatic working of the

marketplace. In locating enduring power in government alone, this outlook treats all other use of power as a transient conflict of self-interested parties vying for the hand of government. Pluralism even maintains that the low voting turnout of the community is a sign that the concatenation of competing forces is well balanced since people only turn to government when their interests are not better satisfied elsewhere. Thus, political participation is seen as a kind of kinetic energy, something that is active only when someone's self interest is affected. That this conception ignores the presence of institutionalized power, indeed, ignores it at a time of vast hierarchical organizations, is obvious.

Resulting from this investigation of the schools of thought on the question of community power is a series of preconceptions and ideas that seems to give a more comprehensive view and to be more attuned to traditional conceptions of power. This posture toward power includes the following assumptions:

1. Power as a constant feature of the community is structured into a hierarchy of control and decision-making.
2. Control over the community implies setting the boundaries of thought and activities for the citizens of the community. Thus, power does not only push the community in certain directions by overt issue resolution, but may stabilize the community by setting the limits of political change. Power is the capacity to define the arena of public debate as well as the capacity to decide the course of civic projects.
3. Power is discernible as it is embodied in social values. A person derives his power not from any individual or unique capacity, but from representing major social valuations.
4. To study the full scope of community power, emphasis must be placed on historical depth in order that one does not infer community power structure from an analysis of only what is going on today. By longer-range historical analysis, one is assured of seeing power as it acts as well as when it refrains from acting.

5. A fundamental distinction must be made between two types of power, namely, the distinction between political authority and influence. Political authority or official power is formally constituted and legitimate power. In our system, it is that which is derived from elective office. Influence is the power that accrues to positions at the apex of the community's most honored institutions. Although in some systems political authority and influence are coterminous, it is their divergence that produces the major tensions in our communities.

The major advances of this body of ideas over the Dahl and Hunter models are its emphasis on historical depth and the value system of the community, and its sensitivity to power effecting the community through its inaction as well as its action. Now that this preliminary frame of reference has been presented let us turn to the way in which a middle-sized community operates in terms of it. If these conceptions have any greater utility than former ones, our picture of community power structure should be more full-bodied and comprehensive. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 analyze three issues which have arisen in Peoria, Illinois, in light of this concept of power and describe the structure and processes of power in that community. Chapter 5 analyzes the importance of value systems in understanding the workings of power in the American community and describes the specific set of values which define and circumscribe the system of power. Chapter 6 concludes with an overall view of power in the community and outlines a number of substantive propositions worthy of further test.

CHAPTER 2

GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION: REFORM IN PEORIA AND SPRINGFIELD

The very first impression in observing a middle-sized community leads one to ask not how issues arise and are resolved, but why nothing happens at all. This first impression tends to be corroborated by later observations, especially in the case of Rockford or Springfield. It is not a completely accurate observation about Peoria, which is openly involved with problems of downtown renewal, race relations, and, in 1963, fired its city manager on grounds that appear to demand greater policy ideas from that office. If one refers by the phrase "nothing happens" to a general community passivity relative to its major developmental problems and to its corporate future, then all of the Illinois cities must be seen in a state of political quiescence. Apart from the day-to-day business of administering a large city, little appears on the surface besides a charity drive, a school bond issue, or a new building. Somehow in studying the structure and processes of power, one expects conflictual events, perhaps deep social cleavages, and even ambitious attempts to capture the scepter of power. Instead, except for small and inconsequential ripples, all appears serene. Having been sensitized, however, by former training and thought to the idea that power is there if we look deeply enough, we are certain that the calm itself is significant. We also know that it is easiest to study power as it actually manifests itself and so we must broaden our historical perspective in order to discover what major community problems have been overtly initiated, endorsed, and perhaps fought over in the last few years.

In searching out issues in a community, it is important to discover those key problems or events which best epitomize the social forces affecting the political agenda. In most cases, a first impression of general serenity is itself the result of a set of events occurring in the past which created and reenforced the present state of community equilibrium. In the Peoria situation, the structure and processes of the present power alignment have their roots in the reform movement of the early

1950's. Although reform was somewhat more cataclysmic in Peoria than in many other cities, its general features are common to the major political "revolution" of the middle-sized community--the ascension of "middle-class" politics. The other two problems discussed in the present monograph--the movement of metropolitan political integration and the issue of open occupancy in public housing--derive their meaning from the concatenation of forces and values that set its stamp upon the community during its reform.

I. The Old Order

Peoria has, since its prominence in the nineteenth and early twentieth century as a major American distilling center, been known far and wide as a locus of vice and corruption. In World War II, many young Peorians in their journeys throughout the country learned with some pique and humiliation of the ribald image of their town. Upon returning, a group of these veterans resolved to make over their community. As is the case with most popular movements, some of the veterans were participating for community advancement, while most were participating for personal advancement. Despite these divergent motives, they were able to make common cause for a time.

Their investigation of city hall revealed politicians firmly entrenched in gambling and prostitution, in petty privilege and illegal convenience everywhere. Organized primarily through Junior Chamber of Commerce, the veterans faced the problem of overthrowing l'ancien regime. What seemed to be required was a fundamental root-and-branch solution. The entrenched group had often been defeated at the polls by a very temporarily outraged citizenry, but they inevitably came back. Something more than periodic electoral action was needed. The first course of action that seemed to offer promise was a direct attack upon the prostitution and gambling base of political power. This line of attack was checked with the Chicago Crime Commission, and it was discovered that such an approach would be expensive, time-consuming, and perhaps ineffectual. How could a corrupt political regime be cleansed by legal machinery that in several ways was connected to that regime? Obviously, some other course of action had to be utilized. However, in 1950, there was no ready solution at hand.

The political system in Peoria had features similar to those encountered by reformers of municipal government since the age of Lincoln Steffens. Peoria is divided ecologically into two parts of distinct social significance. The area of the first settlement along the Illinois River is called the Valley and is now inhabited by labor, the dispossessed Negroes, and the new migrants. The higher land overlooking the river valley is called the Bluff and is inhabited by remnants of the old upper class and middle class, as well as by the more successful offspring of the Valley residents. This social dichotomy symbolized by actual geographical boundaries is the most enduring social cleavage within the community. Although the official rhetoric of harmony and progress denies the reality of the Valley-Bluff split, its presence is implicitly acknowledged. It has major consequences for the election of city officials and the kind of administration they run.

The Valley has been and continues to be Democratic in party affiliation, the Bluff Republican. It is characteristic of cleavages of this type in American cities that the poorer strata, having the larger population and the most to gain from politics, have been politically organized in a fairly efficient way, while the wealthier classes have been busy striving for or stabilizing opulence. Thus, while decrying the lack of good leadership, the elite of Peoria had done little in an enduring way to stem the tide of municipal corruption. Like business elites in most American cities, they often selected candidates and backed them financially. Although their candidates for mayor often won, the power of the system was too pervasive to succumb to the reform mayors' good intentions.

What grew and proliferated over the years was a government officially run by "politicians". This government was semi-feudal in form and personal in character. The political sphere became a body of activities paralleling the economic market-

place in goals and in consequences. Those among the poor who through birth or circumstance could utilize the election system for private gain simply emulated the goals of their betters who were manipulating the marketplace. In a society which stressed the importance of individual success above all else, politics was another avenue for advancement. But whereas technical and organizational requirements led to increasing bureaucratization in the economy, the polity, which putatively ran in the public interest, became personal, nonbureaucratic, and loosely organized. Organization for the making of profit could be above board while organization for power had to be clandestine. The cementing agents of economic organization were rules emphasizing impersonal technical criteria, legitimate authority, and objective standards of excellence. The cementing agents of political organization were rules stressing trust, honor, and loyalty. For many years, then, the "same old gang" loosely organized in a bureaucratic sense, but still the only enduring political organization found in Peoria, controlled city hall by their fealty and loyalty to the somewhat private desires of their constituencies.

Railroad barons could say "let the public be damned" and gain some grudging public respect for business activity, but politicians, acting upon this maxim, reinforced the already tarnished image of public power. If, said the reformer, the police are in league with politicians and gangsters, if streets and sewers can only be fixed by knowing the right telephone number to call, then the whole public suffers. This is what happened to Peoria. The "influential" people in town were not unaware of this, but they had other things to do and many of them had somewhat venal connections to City Hall themselves. Moreover, they could pay for most of their needs without good government. Thus, the magnates of finance, industry, and commerce in Peoria could, on the one hand, decry the level of public service while,

on the other hand, permit this state of affairs to continue. The whole set of standards about the proper conduct of political life, which they as the most respectable members of the community upheld and reinforced, added to the ambiguity regarding political chicanery.

II. The Impetus of Political Change

One cannot see the impetus to change as completely encompassed by the spontaneous reform tendencies of the returning veterans. There had to be at least two major forces in support of change in order to bring about governmental reform. One precondition was a community atmosphere connected to a growing middle class which was ready for continuing "good government". The other precondition was the presence of innovative leadership that had time free from the usual occupational demands, that had access to comparative information about how to change governmental structures, and that had a stable social position from which to act as liaison between veterans and their necessary elite backing. In this case, Caterpillar Tractor Company, a large economic bureaucracy, which was involved in community relations as a modern corporate function, had the personnel with time to devote to the problem of reform. The major coordinating and innovative activities of the reform movement stemmed from one middle management Caterpillar employee who was firmly supported in his community activities by higher executive personnel.

The veterans, however, played an essential role. Because of their youth and lack of stable place in the community, they could swing their weight with little fear of consequences to status and convenience. As one activist has put it, "While the president of a bank may be bounded by many private considerations, we are not and therefore have more free rein to do what we like to do." The veterans

could investigate houses of gambling and prostitution, uncover the disreputable state of public finance and check various and sundry illicit activities which a man with a respectable business could never do. The business elite was very important in the reform as well as any other major movement. It had to be appealed to for three major things over which only it had control--money, personnel, and solid reputation. Since the elite had been publically denouncing the corruption of Peoria political life and had been privately supporting reform candidates, it was assumed and rightly so in the majority of the cases, that they could be trusted to use their influence for reform. Rumors abounded, however, which cast some doubt on the possibility of uniform and instantaneous support by the top people in town. For example, some veterans in approaching the newspaper for its necessary support discovered that it was recalcitrant. It appears that the newspaper feared the loss of local advertising if it indulged in muckraking activities which disclosed the connection of local business to city hall. Much first-hand evidence about the relations of politics, gangsterism, and business was, it was rumored, brought into the newspaper by idealistic reformers, only to be rejected by unofficial editorial policy. It was only later during the reform period, when its community-wide support was strong and all-important public opinion was marshalled, that the newspaper caught the crusading spirit.

The problem facing the reform group, then, was to displace the old politicians with "honest" and "upright" citizens. It was also necessary to do this on an enduring basis so that good political officials would not be eventually overthrown at the polls by the organized and experienced old guard. Since the reformers were middle class in orientation toward government, they were predisposed toward that alternative which, since World War II, had increasingly met the needs of a reform-minded middle class--

the City Manager form of government. Changing the traditional system of ward elections to an at-large system, taking parties out of local politics , and separating the legislative from the administrative branch of the government seemed to constitute a permanent remedy.

In order to effectuate this kind of a change in Peoria, however, it was necessary to get legislation, not yet present at the state level, which would enable a city to choose by means of a referendum, a City Manager form of government. Fortuitously for the reformers, such enabling legislation was being passed at the state level at this particular time. With their strategy clearly demarcated, the problem of winning such a referendum was the first order of the day, and the reformers organized into a movement called Peorians for Council-Manager, or PCM. The challenge of corruption, the presence of the veterans to do the major work, and the innovative idea by which to carry out reform welded PCM into a community-wide organization embodying elements of most important social strata. Given this configuration of circumstances, nothing could stop reform and the PCM referendum was accepted by Peorians in a landslide. In fact, in spite of an ice storm on that 1952 election day, the referendum carried by a vote of 15,000 to 7,000 and PCM workers themselves took more than 4,000 people to the polls.

III. The Dilemmas of Reform

Since PCM was involved not only in a change of governmental form but also in assuring that elected candidates would start the new system on a firm footing, it decided, after the referendum, not to disband but to continue as a slate-endorsing

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Given the political apathy usually prevailing in an American community, this phrase must be taken in a relative sense.

agency. As a movement dedicated to take partisanship out of local politics, this decision led to a dilemma both internal and external to the organization. If PCM was not to be a party, how could it justify its continuance as a political organization? Moreover, to all but the most politically sophisticated, what essential difference was there between a slate-endorsing agency and a party? Internal dissidence in PCM developed as many believed that its function was complete as soon as the referendum had passed. The old-time politicians, meanwhile, increasingly exploited the possibilities of PCM's own dilemma by accusing it of something of which it already considered itself guilty. Thus, although PCM meant to reform Peoria, it was hesitant about creating an enduring organization to fulfill its mission.

Other difficulties presented themselves during the initial stage of choosing the PCM slate of candidates. A committee formed to locate and encourage worthy candidates discovered that although everyone was for reform, not everyone wished to leave the respectable world of business and professional life for the controversial world of elective office. Reform in American cities is often negative in program and transient in character. It lasts only as long as is necessary to destroy the negligence and corruption of the past. It seldom succeeds in building an effective organization for the instituting of a program for the future.

Thus, two major factors prepared the demise of the reform movement at its very beginnings. The first was the lack of willingness of "good citizens" to assume the overt responsibilities of public power; they had at best only a grudging desire to serve in the public interest for as short a period as possible. PCM attracted candidates at an early and high state of emotional intensity by promising them that they need make no more than a one-term commitment. The second factor, interconnected with

the first, was a paucity of programmatic ideas for legislation. Reform was chiefly dedicated to cleansing the city of its past vices by throwing out the old regime and instituting a professional city government which would fulfill municipal services in an honest and efficient manner. Reflecting the democratic belief in government by rules rather than men, PCM wished to entrust public sovereignty to a government controlled by impersonal standards. Paradoxically, the reformers were responsible for creating a government which, because it could run by itself, could also free Peorians from any greater responsibility to it. Reform in no sense represented a desire for continual political involvement of the citizenry with the workings of municipal government. The reasons for lack of involvement were that reform had little relation to ideas about building a future Peoria and that reformers were people whose major goals in life did not involve a firm dedication to political activities. The same reformers who continually decried the presence of general public apathy, partook in this apathy in the day-to-day conduct of their lives.

It would be wrong to assume that all people opposed to the governmental change in Peoria had their hands in the public till, worked for patronage, were connected to the gangster elements, or were directly or indirectly organized by ward heelers. Even though the opposition did include these groups, a number of people who had no personal stake in the old system were either against at-large elections or against a City Manager form. Some of these opponents were dissident members of the Junior Chamber of Commerce. The opposition emphasized the importance of a direct connection of politicians to the electorate in a ward system of representation and argued that the at-large system took government out of the people's hands. It was also implied by the opposition that the reform movement was an organized clique, controlled by a sinister group of top businessmen traditionally alluded to in Peoria as the "secret sixteen". Given the fact that the movement did have the necessary support of personnel

from the biggest banks and biggest industries in town and given the fact that PCM was a fully organized entity with the purpose of gaining public power, this argument claimed cogency, and was indirectly supported by the vehement denials of it made by the PCMs. Since it is not considered proper in America to overtly strive for power, PCM refused to honestly admit that these accusations might be true, but unimportant. This reticence is another one of the ironies of public power: groups are hesitant of openly admitting that they are struggling for power on the implicit grounds that the public arena only enlists people of ulterior motive.

The efficacy of the opposition did not result so much from its own influence in the community as much as from the effects of the opposition on the internal membership of the PCM organization. Two other examples will prove this point. One is the reaction of the official political parties in the Peoria area. Both the Democratic and Republican Parties showed some opposition to the idea of another organization possibly interfering with the traditional political setup, because this would undercut the allegiance of PCMs to the official parties. Secondly, the slate of candidates ran afoul of those within the organization whose political ambitions were thwarted by the selections of the slating committee. In one case, involving a person of known vote-getting strength who had firmly supported the PCM referendum, this oversight created opposition which became a perpetual thorn in the flesh of reform legislation. This opposition could and did accuse the movement of autocratic methods of candidate endorsement.

IV. No Longer Corrupt; Only Contented

All these aforementioned difficulties, which were part of the PCM movement at its inception and heralded its later decline, went unnoticed in the flush of early

zeal and victory. For at the first at-large election held in Peoria in 1953, five councilmen and the Mayor out of the nine elected officials were endorsed by PCM. Yet it must be realized that, as soon as the election was over, the steam was out of the movement, as most people settled back to let good government do the job for them.

The first task of the new government was to hire a professional to reorganize municipal administration. This resulted in the uprooting of interests entrenched in illicit money-making and substituted a system of universal standards of municipal service for the earlier system of personal patronage. Theoretically, the city manager takes over all administrative functions formerly performed by elected officials. The ideal is to separate administration from policy-making and to free legislation from the day-to-day burdens of municipal housekeeping.

An important factor in the problem of legislation is inherent in the City Manager form of government. Along with the major ideals of honesty, efficiency and impersonality, are other business ideals peculiar to conducting city government. The City Manager form of government is supposed to run as an efficient business cutting costs where it can and getting as much work out of every city employee as possible. But connected to the business idea of government is also the idea that politics should do as little as possible and only fulfill its traditional municipal functions of paving roads, fighting fires, cleaning streets, etc. Good government means small government, low costs and low taxes. In line with this conception is the fact that the elected officials are paid small salaries (in Peoria, it was \$1,500 a year), and are, in essence, expected to treat their jobs as rather civic-minded hobbies. Thus, at its inception the Manager form is expected to be a business without major characteristics which are the sine qua non of any functioning economic enterprise--the resources for expansion, and firmly committed and dedicated

executives for setting policy. The City Manager form of government can become a freak of social organization, a bureaucracy without executive leadership. Thus, in Peoria, although the city was fortunate in its first reform administration in having both a strong mayor and an unusually politically sophisticated city manager, the very limitations inherent in this kind of governmental change resulted in a dearth of original and pathbreaking legislation. The unusual combination of strong executive and strong administrator facilitated the task of municipal reorganization but by the time this task was completed, the thermidorean reaction had set in.

During the initial "honeymoon" period of city government, the groundswell of community response that built the PCM movement steadily declined as the tendencies inherent in the community slowly worked to prepare Peoria for its usual state of public disengagement. Since most Peorians joined PCM as a moral protest against the abuses of City Hall, a change in political personnel which cleansed former sins led to a marked diminution of reform-minded citizens. This return to apathy amongst the majority of citizens is common to reform everywhere. Added to this apathy was the reaction of PCM to criticisms made of it. Since PCM was sensitive to being branded as a political tyranny, continual attacks of this kind both inside and outside the city council took their toll. In the 1955 election, what was left of the PCM organization endorsed the whole incumbent council, including the opponents within it, in order to dispel any suspicion of PCM's autocracy. In so doing, it reenforced a secure nucleus of opposition in the succeeding council. Moreover, and this is a most important point, the old politicians who were superseded by the reform movement were still dedicated to the pursuit of official power and waited in the wings for reform to act out its part on the political stage. Whereas reformers have no more interest in

politics than to instigate moral reform, the old guard's involvement is lifelong and persevering. Thus, the old politicians were and still are waiting to resume their places in municipal government.

In the election of 1955, just two years after the PCM slate had won a majority of the city council, the opponents of PCM, including both the old guard and reform dissidents won a majority of council seats. Perhaps the best index of public lethargy is shown by a comparison of voting turnouts in the two periods. Whereas 30,000 Peorians cast their votes in the city election in 1953, only 19,000 voted in 1955. The at-large character of the new election did assure that the whole old guard did not reassume power, but the general tenor of the new council certainly lacked the zealotry of the reform council. In 1960, the old guard made a strategic move by initiating a referendum for the reenstatement of the ward system of elections. Surprisingly, at least to the remnants of the original PCM movement, the referendum passed. Although it is claimed by these reformers that the passing of this referendum was due to peculiar circumstances, it still demonstrates the extremely shaky public support behind any enduring political reformation in Peoria. Since there is not, at present, any state legislation enabling a return to the at-large system, at-large representation may have little chance of being returned in the near future. Thus, Peoria is presently in the throes of a rather incongruous political situation--ward elections combined with a city manager. Moreover, the City Manager form itself is in jeopardy as there are continued rumblings among the old guard that portend the possibility of a referendum to abolish the office of the city manager.

V. Conclusions

In one very real sense some of the changes effected by the reform period are irreversible. The presence of new professionals in city departments and the instituting of planning are connected to general trends in American society, and it is unlikely that any old politician would reinstitute the spoils system. Paradoxically, this new efficient and rational organization of municipal services could also portend a long period of stabilized community lethargy. Given the fact that Peorians are only aroused by extremely deleterious conditions, a situation of bureaucratized good service alone will do nothing to stimulate indolent political sensibilities. If so-called good citizens wish only to curb the perversities of power rather than to utilize it for planned community development, then the best that can be hoped for is a government of honest housekeepers.

In conclusion, it might be well to summarize some of the major points relevant to the reform period in Peoria:

1. Reform was due to a moral reaction by middle-class citizens to the dishonesty, graft, and corruption of traditional political officials. Its major impetus involved ideas of changing the moral calibre of city hall and not the legislative goals of government.
2. Reform did not envision any long range citizen involvement with politics. It was never prepared to become an enduring political organization with expressed purpose, full-time personnel, and steady financial resources.
3. The economic elite in Peoria, although often prepared to support civic causes, is wary of complete involvement in community problems unless these problems are proven to be uncontroversial. Thus, there must be a

broad middle level of activists to stimulate the elite to utilize its potential leadership. Although some support from the elite was absolutely necessary for the success of reform, its leadership qualities are passive rather than active. (Presently, influential people continue to work behind the scenes for candidates, but it is unlikely that they would institute any basic reform without some sort of grass-roots stimulation.)

4. The ongoing process of professionalization of city government which took a great step forward during the reform period appears irreversible. It lays the groundwork for educating political officials in ideas relevant for constructive policy formation.
5. The reform movement can only be understood by seeing it in terms of the underlying values which define the use of public power and how these values work to uphold the worth of the economy at the expense of the polity.

VI. Springfield Reform and its Aftermath

Along with the example of reform in Peoria, the present study, which involved research on two other Illinois communities, revealed some highly relevant case materials in the Springfield situation. These data confirm the view that the ideas of reform, by renouncing long-range constituency commitment, establish a governmental system which still does not deal with major community development needs. This analysis of Springfield, past and present, demonstrates the long-range stability of "good government" without policy, and portends the future of Peoria's recent reform movement.

Springfield, the capital of Illinois, is often called a political town by its residents. Apart from its obvious reference to the presence of state government, the word "political" in this context means something more simple than what it means to the academic thinker. When the proverbial man on the street refers to the "politicalness" of his community, he means that people are very interested in elective office and the events surrounding the acquisition of electoral power. In the Springfield community, interest and activity build to the crescendo of the campaign and immediately subside after the election. Between campaigns, except perhaps for future campaigners who are always mending fences, community response to politics is negligible. The sparse attendance at weekly city council meetings and the half-hearted coverage of issues in the local press bear witness to this fact. Thus, it is the gamesmanship and rewards of political power which jostle the Springfield resident, and it is to this alone that he refers in calling his town political.

Part of the explanation for this situation requires a description of the general features of the Springfield political community. In a wave of earlier reform against the rule of old-style politicians, Springfield had changed its form of government from the ward-aldermanic to the at-large commission form. This occurred under the stimulus of a citizens' reform movement in the year 1911 and instituted the governmental form that has lasted until the present day. Interestingly enough, the reform ideas of 1911 involved conceptions of businesslike government, of small, low cost government, which are similar to those expressed in the 1952 reform movement in Peoria. In fact, the present state of the Springfield government, when seen in terms of its earlier reform objectives, lends credence to the prognos-

tifications made about reform in Peoria (and, perhaps about reform movements in general). As in Peoria, the Springfield citizens' group was supported by the influence and wealth of the top business leaders. Again, under state enabling legislation, the community was permitted to change its governmental form, to a form which separates municipal administration into five departments, each under a commissioner. One commissioner is the Mayor who formally has no greater executive power than any other commissioner and who assumes general ceremonial functions. Unlike the City Manager form, which often suffers from the absence of executive leadership while strengthening administrative centralization, the commission form has predispositions toward weakness in both directions. Springfield is typical of many commission plans in that administratively, it always tends to fragment into five autonomous empires, each interested in stabilizing its power which, in turn, has the legislative effect of reenforcing caution rather than daring. This form, however, was the fashionabale reform plan of another day, and a Springfield referendum embraced it fully.

Consistent also with Peoria was the presence of idealistic, civic-minded candidates during the height of reform. One important difference, however, was the presence and long-term influence of an engineer named Willis Spaulding. Spaulding was recruited by business leaders to run for commissioner in order to clean up a scandalous situation in the water department and generally to construct government on a sound administrative basis. He responded to the call and was instrumental over many years service as commissioner of public utilities in instituting major changes toward efficient administration. Under the banner of economy, he later even accomplished the establishment of a municipally-owned electric power plant.

The same inexorable forces leading to the demise of reform in Peoria worked their effect on Springfield--the fact that reform was moral in a personal rather than a legislative way, the fact that good citizens wanted to change government from an irritating to an unbothersome child, the fact that public service was a secondary and disreputable activity and the fact that public power, at best, should have integrity without goals and economy without production. Thus, the formal change of government in Springfield signalled a reduction in the relatively high level of community involvement characteristic of the reform movement. The good citizens went back to their personal affairs with the satisfaction that they had gotten the problem of politics out of their hair.

Undoubtedly, reform, to some extent, succeeded in accomplishing the major task which it set for itself. It meant to uproot the organization and the access of "old-line" politicians to City Hall, and with notable exceptions succeeded. Never again has the government been flushed with corruption, patronage, and graft; ✓ the enduring political organization of the poor has been partially exchanged for the more honest but ad hoc political organization of the middle class. Elections changed from the personal, somewhat stable feudal associations of the poor wards to the impersonal, pseudo-friendly, mass-media driven campaigns in the city as a whole. Periodically, an unusual member of the "better" classes in response to aristocratic desires for public service might break up the dreary years of legislative lethargy, or someone like Spaulding, of excellent repute because of his earlier exploits, would support an exceptional candidate, but generally Springfield up to the present has been if not a misgoverned, certainly an ungoverned city.

What was predicted as Peoria's future has become Springfield's past. It was claimed as paradoxical about Peoria that a change to honest and efficient municipal service is portentous of a long future of community lethargy. Since the dominant ideal of reform is to clean up government rather than see government develop the community, the absence of conditions warranting a cleanup tends to preclude political change of any kind. Of course, the fragmentation and secrecy of each empire in the commission form still presents the unscrupulous or semi-scrupulous with some chance to feather his nest. Thus, Springfield has seen some reform demands, albeit not as comprehensive as its 1911 one, which now and then bring to the surface the time-honored American desire to catch and punish the culprits who are undoing public morals. But, in the main, to be political in this political town is to indulge every four years in the sport, entertainment, and opportunity of the popularity contest known as an election.

It is in this context that Springfield's most recent reform impetus must be understood. I call it an "impetus" because it appears clear that the situation precludes any widespread reform "movement". In fact, as would be expected, reform can be seen in the character and activities of one man, Nelson Howarth. Nelson Howarth was, like the Peoria reformers, a veteran who during the war decided that it was more important to improve one's home community than to improve one's personal status. Returning to Springfield, he went into law practice and became recognized as a man of binding work and scrupulous integrity. As Assistant States Attorney of Sangamon County he personally and forcefully was involved in destroying vice and gambling at the county level. As that rare man of talent interested in

running for local office, he built support from those few people who were truly interested in good leadership and from the many more who say they want it until they get it. He successfully ran for Mayor in 1955 after a close loss in 1951.

Mayor Howarth, with the purpose of abolishing gambling, reorganized the whole police force, hired a new police chief, and ruled that policemen could not hold any outside jobs. As commissioner in charge of the police department this change was formally within the mayor's jurisdiction. This was not so with a number of other missionary activities performed by Howarth including (1) the reorganization of a cemetery commission because of allegedly-irregular funeral plot activities, (2) personal and continual demands for high city employment standards, and (3) investigation and critique of budgeting and expenses of all city departments. Moreover, Howarth was known to keep tabs on what was occurring in all departments. In general, he took very seriously the idea that government should be honest in its dealings with itself and with the public at large. It has been said of Mayor Howarth that "his grandmother couldn't get a ticket fixed."

Concomitant with the equitable and just application of universal regulations as a function of government, Howarth proposed and pushed through programs relevant to community welfare and development. These included:

1. A program of urban renewal, with the creation of a plan commission.
2. Full support for major planning measures including, during his term, relief of traffic congestion and unbending enforcement of zoning (an unusual occurrence for downstate Illinois cities.)
3. Plans for a civic center, including the beginnings of construction

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of a new municipal building.

The apex of the Howarth program was an attempt to annex Leland Grove, the incorporated area in which the top influentials in the community live. The mayor considered it unjust that the people of high income and proven leadership abilities should use Springfield's services while paying taxes elsewhere. Moreover, Howarth also had strong sentiments about the welfare functions of government. Thus, he saw the need for the taxes of the rich to assist the poor. The city of Springfield was under contract to meet Leland Grove's fire protection needs. The contract expired during Howarth's term in office. Since, said the Mayor, Springfield residents were being taxed for the safety of Leland Grove, he threatened to end fire service unless Leland Grove became a part of the city through referendum. In the referendum Leland Grove residents chose three to one not to become part of the city of Springfield. The ambiguity of business leaders is witnessed in this vote, since all major leaders came out in favor of annexation publically and there was no organized opposition to it. Leland Grove residents claim that it was the high-handed methods used by the mayor which made them refuse annexation, but the size of the opposition vote makes this assertion somewhat dubious. In zoning, in planning, and in annexation, business leadership in Springfield supports the programs of change in general until these programs directly challenge individual privileges and conveniences embedded in the status quo.

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In looking at the whole Howarth platform and from interviews with him, one cannot assume that he originated any ideas which see government in terms other than the way that the prevailing value system sees it. What differentiates him from other political leaders was that he took public service seriously and, in so doing, underlined the ambiguity of the middle-class desire for simple integrity in government.

Let us itemize the Howarth record of alienation at the end of his four-year term:

1. Alienation of city employees for demanding high work standards.
2. Alienation of real-estate interests for refusing spot zoning.
3. Alienation of the business community for pressing annexation.
4. Alienation of the community in general for scrupulous enforcement of the law.

The growing, if fragmented, population of resentment against specific Howarth proposals, because they had "stepped on toes", resulted in the election of a new mayor in 1959 who conceived government more in line with what the Springfield political system usually demands, as a servant of the "felt needs" of vocal interests. Yet there is a lingering guilt in the community in its reaction to Mayor Howarth which, although not enough to assure stable political organization behind leadership of this type, still prophecies ephemeral community involvement with strong and principled candidates. For example, in 1963, Howarth, running as an underdog, unseated the incumbent mayor. Perhaps the following statement, heard often in Springfield, best sums up community sentiment about Howarth specifically and strong political leadership in general. "He is a good mayor but he makes too many enemies". As long as ideas of good government involves good men without program, strong leadership with program will be transient.

The following conclusions regarding the capabilities of the Springfield community for instituting long-range, programmatic political leadership can be made:

1. Springfield's greatest involvement with program has been, first, to create trustworthy government without ideas and only to elect a strong leader when specific need arises. Since real program demands real change and real change always hurts someone, it is better for no one to get hurt rather than to take the chance of being hurt oneself.
2. Real community development that would organize the sentiments and ideas of the community around future planning for Springfield is lacking. This cannot occur until government becomes a reputable institution for social change rather than, at best, a good municipal housekeeper, and, at worst, a facilitator of private gain.
3. As in Peoria, the key to the problems of political leadership in Springfield revolves around the social elite's view of the political process which is, in turn, accepted by the whole community. The men of influence, wealth, and repute in the city accept and often support strong leadership, but their involvement is ad hoc and transient, and they often obstruct major developmental programs when their specific interests are threatened. As long as government is honest, it is expected that it be mediocre. Honest and intelligent leadership, however, is unexpected and therefore punished.

The description of the reform periods in Peoria and Springfield corroborate the view that political participation by a social elite cannot be mobilized except for transient moral reform. The prevailing value system enforced by the dominant business community views politics as an evil to be removed and not as an opportunity to be garnered. Thus, reform, instead of making government more venturesome, simply makes it less troublesome.

CHAPTER 3

THE ANNEXATION CAMPAIGN: "MAKE NO LITTLE PLANS...."

I. Suburbanization in the Peoria Area

It is a commonplace that wealthier families have been steadily moving away from the center of American cities. The middle-sized Illinois cities are no exception to this trend. In Peoria's case, Richwood township, the part of the urban area immediately to the north of the city, has grown so rapidly that in 1960 it was the second most populous township in the state. Containing 4,870 people in 1940, Richwoods grew to 9,107 in 1950 and 22,320 in 1960. Presently, the population of Richwoods constitutes over one-quarter of the population of Peoria county outside the city of Peoria. Taking only the inner ring of suburban townships, cities and villages around Peoria, one finds that two-thirds of the total population increase since 1950 has taken place within Richwoods.

The business elite has been moving into this area with increasing frequency since World War II. In a survey of a representative sample of presidents and vice-presidents of the largest manufacturing, banking, and commercial establishments in the Peoria area, it was found that 61 percent live outside the city, and more than half of these suburbanites live in Richwoods Township. It might be noted that the median family income of this group is \$39,800. Although Richwoods has been a popular destination for the elite since 1946, the area has shown greater gains since 1958 than in any previous period. If one calculates the net gains and losses for the major sub-areas of the Peoria metropolitan area from 1946 through 1961, Richwoods has experienced a net gain of the business elite two and a half times that of its nearest competitor area, which is itself on the northern periphery just within the city limit. The people of highest repute, economic affiliation, and income, while working in the city, reside in the suburbs. Thus, one of the major purposes of the earlier reform movement--to include top leadership in the political affairs of the city--is being abrogated by this major residential movement.

When suburban populations become dense enough to demand the complex services of an urban government, they sometimes form a new municipal corporation and separate from the township. In the Chicago metropolitan area alone, there have been 61 new incorporations since 1950. In Springfield, a prestigious residential area at the southwest edge of the city was incorporated in the early 1950's. Richwoods Township is unusual in that upper middle-class groups have established residence there over a long period of time without showing more than casual interest in creating a separate city.

The problem of large populations resident in unincorporated territory has also been "solved" by annexation. However, this device has not been employed as frequently by Peoria as by many other cities of its size. From time to time, Peoria has annexed small areas at the periphery, the last two instances involving tracts totalling one-half square mile in 1959 and one square mile in 1956. In the case of Richwoods, some citizens desired entry into the city immediately after World War II but the city council refused their request.

By 1960, the residents of the Richwoods area had established two kinds of social institutions, the continued autonomy of which seemed to be increasingly desirable. These were elementary school districts and neighborhood homeowners associations. The latter had assumed a key role in zoning policy within the county. If a zoning change was desired, the potential applicant first submitted his plan to the homeowners association where the land was located. Only after approval by the association did he go to the county governing body for a formal change, which was then usually granted without question.

II. Making an Annexation Plan

In 1960, the coincidence of three factors precipitated a movement that was concerned with metropolitan governmental structure and had its impetus within the Peoria Association of Commerce. First, the preliminary census results had

demonstrated that Peoria had lost its position to Rockford as the second largest city in Illinois. In fact, the population of the city declined from 111,856 in 1950 to 103,162 in 1960. Secondly, return to the ward system of electing city councilmen was seen as connected to the movement of middle-class voters and elite leadership to the suburbs. Finally, the incumbent president of the Association of Commerce was a major activist in civic affairs. The emergence of these events dovetailed quite nicely with ongoing Association of Commerce community involvement, which comprehends the rhetoric of (1) the desire for rationalized and integrated governmental machinery, (2) the belief that new industrial development and governmental integration are necessarily connected, and (3) the image of a "bigger and better Peoria". The president of the Association of Commerce, with the assistance of the Association staff, selected a committee. Called the Urban-Suburban Relations Committee and made up of top business leaders, most of whom lived outside the city, it decided that annexation was the solution to the "suburban problem", and laid out a general program to accomplish it. The annexation drive thus began, a la Hunter, in a tightly organized group of influential business and professional men who spread their activity outward.

One element of major innovative impetus not found in the Hunter analysis is evident here, however. The assignment of a professional in the Association of Commerce to function as the staff of the committee was of central importance in the annexation drive. He fed initial program material to the Chamber president, and ultimately acquired more knowledge about the problems of annexation in Peoria than any member of the original committee. In view of subsequent events, it is likely that he and perhaps one or two members of the committee were the only people associated with the Association of Commerce who were completely dedicated to annexation, regardless of the controversy that it precipitated. The majority of the Urban-Suburban Relations Committee viewed annexation, from its very in-

ception, in the same way that top business views any civic enterprise. They thought of the Committee as simply setting general policy, organizing subcommittees of middle-level activists, and watching the success of the campaign unfold in an atmosphere of community consensus. The outlook of the United Fund Drive suffused the annexation project.

The Urban-Suburban Relations Committee was carefully selected. The president of the Association of Commerce, two of its staff members, and an astute, civic-minded banker decided upon a membership that was both prestigious and had played previous roles in metropolitan affairs. Meeting throughout the fall of 1960, the Committee hammered out the major policies that were to set the course of the whole annexation movement.

Four key decisions were made wholly within the Committee, without consultation with groups outside. The Committee reached these decisions between September and December, 1960. First, they decided that the best solution to the suburban problem was annexation to Peoria and the place to begin was with Richwoods Township. Second, the annexation of this territory was to be accomplished in one action, not by piecemeal accretions, and the precise boundaries of the territory to be annexed were agreed upon. In addition to all of Richwoods Township outside the Village of Peoria Heights, the area included some strips of three other townships immediately to the west of Peoria. The area covered almost 24 square miles, and included 21,500 people. Third, the Committee chose the petition method of annexation in preference to a referendum. In making this decision, the Committee faced a dilemma. Several members considered the task of distributing petitions and collecting signatures in so large an area to be much too ambitious. On the other hand, the referendum method would have required an ordinance from City Council. Considering the attitudes of several of the councilmen from the Valley, it did not appear likely that such an ordinance could be passed. In

addition, Illinois law stipulated that, under the referendum method, no under-developed area of over 10 acres could be included without the specific consent of the owner. This formal legal provision could have caused problems.

The difficulty of making these three decisions was as nothing, however, compared to the dilemma created by the fourth. This dilemma became a troublesome problem that continued to bedevil the annexation campaign, and was a major reason for its ultimate failure.

The problem arose over schools. By 1960, Richwoods Township included one community high school and a few smaller elementary school districts, all independent of each other and of School District 150 which was the Peoria city school system. Several members of the Urban-Suburban Relations Committee had been instrumental in founding the outlying school districts and in building over the years what they considered to be a superior educational system. A common view, as expressed by a township official, was that "Peoria has a Cadillac government and horse-and-buggy schools, but Richwoods has Cadillac schools with a horse-and-buggy government." These members of the Urban-Suburban Relations Committee shared the view of many in Richwoods Township that control of the schools should not be taken out of the hands of those who had worked so laboriously to lift them to their present lofty position.

Perhaps because the affluent members of the Committee could themselves afford the higher taxes required to operate small autonomous school districts, they assumed that annexation to Peoria would not be welcomed by a majority of Richwoods residents unless school district autonomy were guaranteed at the same time. It was therefore decided that annexation should not take place until there was a legal safeguard for the autonomy of the suburban school districts. A state legislator was a member of the Urban-Suburban Relations Committee, and he was

requested to investigate and sponsor state legislation that would accept the legality of governmental integration without school amalgamation. This legislation was introduced and passed in the 1961 state legislative session as H.B. 1063.

III. Implementing the Plan

During the first six months of 1961, the committee began to cope with the specific problems associated with the accomplishment of their general objectives. In this effort, they broadened the scope of communication, and began discussing the matter with city officials, members of the board of School District 150, and the various suburban school boards. For example, the City Manager and several members of the City Council discussed the means by which the City of Peoria would extend services to the newly-annexed community. The Corporation Counsel participated in the consideration of zoning policy.

Special efforts were made to involve members of the various school boards in Richwoods Township. This was done both to broaden the base of the movement and to keep good faith with the school boards concerning the previous guarantees of autonomy. Several members of these boards did participate in meetings of the Urban-Suburban Relations Committee. But as the committee's plans began to unfold, there was a major reaction from interested parties regarding the school problem. Even before H.B. 1063 became law, suburban school officials expressed serious reservations about this approach to school autonomy. By May, 1961, both the high school board and one of the elementary school boards had formally registered their disapproval of the "vagueness" of the provisions of the bill.

Reactions varied widely among school boards and sometimes among members of a single board. The boards in upper-income districts, some of which were controlled by Association of Commerce influentials, were clearly primarily interested in the autonomy of their own districts, and separated this from the question of

annexation in general. The boards of middle-income areas were, as a rule, more vociferous in their concern for school autonomy--a posture which suggests the possibility that their motives were rather complex. There is evidence that some raised the question of the legality of H.B. 1063 simply as a smokescreen for anti-annexation sentiments in general. Speaking only in the name of schools, people could safely obstruct annexation without being forced to declare themselves openly against it.

As for the school superintendents, those who were from middle-income districts and had strong board reaction behind them were a major anti-annexation force. For, if their school districts were integrated with School District 150, these superintendents would lose much of their power over educational policy, and would become administrative functionaries within a larger system. Thus, suburban school boards and their superintendents were often in league against annexation on the grounds that their schools would not be safe from eventual union with the city system.

Finally, there was a long tradition of distrust of the central city by some school districts, particularly those directly adjacent to the city. In the previous annexation attempts of the 1950's, the city had been nibbling away at pieces of suburban property, some of which constituted sizeable assessed valuations for these school districts.

Despite growing manifestations of discontent among the schoolmen, the Urban-Suburban Relations Committee plunged ahead. In actual fact, there was little else it could do but to attempt to implement its strategy and, in so doing, to hope that persuasion would be effective against potential opponents. By June, 1961, the Committee secured the services of a lawyer, whose major duties revolved around the legal technicalities of running a petition campaign.

During this month the Committee also secured additional members. Assuming that the time was ripe for implementation of the grand plan, the Committee invited a substantial number of middle-management people, professionals, and a few small businessmen to join them. These new members were looked upon as the source of assistance in the complex task of operating the petition campaign. These activists, some of whom participated in the earlier reform movement, were known to be pro-annexation. Naturally, they were somewhat proud of being invited to participate in a project sponsored by a group of community notables. Because they were actually doing the work, the middle-level activists began to dominate the Committee agenda.

By August, it seemed desirable to form a citizen's group outside the Association of Commerce structure. The Urban-Suburban Relations Committee agreed that this would be helpful, provided that policy direction would still be shared by members of the parent committee. This was the genesis of the Citizens Committee for a Greater Peoria. There were two good reasons for creating this new organization. First, the parent committee did not want the annexation campaign to appear to be a project of the Association of Commerce alone, but rather as a community-wide project. An added reason was the notion that the success of the petition campaign would be assured if the Citizens Committee for a Greater Peoria were composed solely of suburban residents. The middle-echelon activists who had just been added to the Urban-Suburban Relations Committee constituted the nucleus of Citizens for a Greater Peoria. By the fall of 1961, district subcommittees in Richwoods Township were being formed, public relations campaigns were being organized, and petitions meeting the necessary legal requirements were being prepared and printed.

There was now a considerable body of opinion in Richwoods Township that was opposed to annexation on the grounds that H.B. 1063 was no actual guarantee of

school autonomy. All but two elementary school boards were actively in opposition, and some formidable legal talent began to convince several members of the Urban-Suburban Relations Committee that the new legislation they had encouraged was seriously defective. The effects of this uncertainty unnerved the Urban-Suburban Relations Committee. Since the problem of school autonomy struck a responsive note in their thinking, most of the members of the parent committee immediately became concerned about the constitutionality of H.B. 1063. After much caucusing and soul searching, it was decided that it would be better to hold up the grand campaign, and, in the interim, to adjudicate H.B. 1063 through a test case involving the annexation of two or three small properties. Interestingly enough, a suburban school board attorney was the leading advocate of unconstitutionality, while the Committee's own lawyer continued to voice his opinion that H.B. 1063 was not invalid.

By this time, however, the Citizens Committee for a Greater Peoria was a fully-organized group, ready to begin the collection of signed petitions. Arguing that the long wait for litigation would destroy their organization, and suspecting that the doubts about H.B. 1063 simply masked obstructionism, the officers of this group decided, with the support of a few Association of Commerce influentials, to contravene the wishes of the majority of the parent committee and to go ahead with the petition drive. Moreover, the Citizens Committee was made up of people with a much greater zeal for the goals of the earlier reform movement than most of the parent committee members evinced. It is safe to assume that they clearly saw annexation as a device to increase the power of the middle-class in local politics and to undercut the potential influence of old-guard politicians representing inner-city wards. Thus, with the implicit disapproval of most of the parent committee, and with vocal opposition from school supporters and from people whose interests were connected to the present governmental

organizations, such as volunteer firemen and township supervisors, the Citizens Committee for a Greater Peoria began its house-th-house campaign for signed petitions.

Although official results of the petition campaign were never released, there is reason to believe that things did not go well. School boards and school officials were vocal in their antagonism toward their constituents signing the annexation petitions. In one district, children were sent home from school with literature warning parents that petitions should not be signed until litigation had established the legality of H.B. 1063. In the door-to-door campaign itself, the ambiguity regarding the school issue led to great difficulties in getting signatures. On the one hand, people who were concerned about school autonomy, regardless of their attitude toward annexation, would not sign petitions until a test case had proven the constitutionality of H.B. 1063. On the other hand, a number of residents were in favor of annexation only if the suburban schools became part of the Peoria city school system.

Meanwhile, the members of the parent committee who favored adjudicating H.B. 1063 considered that actions of the Citizens Committee in beginning the drive without official consent were an exercise in duplicity. The Citizens Committee did not, however, commit open rebellion against the desires of the whole parent committee. The latter group was internally divided. A minority, including the president of the Association of Commerce, supported the position of the citizens group. There is no doubt that the Citizens Committee recognized the importance of influential backing. They would have never gone ahead with the petition drive without at least covert support from some Association of Commerce leaders. It is important to recognize that the middle-level activists were not a competing power group. They quite clearly recognized the need for legitimation from some part of the upper-status elite. It was the split within the parent committee that put the citizens' group in the position of appearing to be acting on its own.

The importance of the business notables is demonstrated by the final results of the petition drive. Since the parent committee feared the loss of school autonomy, two key members negotiated a legal settlement with attorneys representing the school boards. It was agreed that the signed petitions would be held in escrow until the constitutionality of H.B. 1063 was tested. This decision and the implicit power of the group behind it were quietly accepted by the Citizens Committee, which gave up its already-collected petitions. The only tangible results of the annexation campaign have been locked in a bank vault since the spring of 1962.

As a final bit of irony, it might be noted that some of the same people who were questioning the validity of H.B. 1063 are now using it successfully to keep the property of people who are annexing to Peoria within the Richwoods school district, despite the wishes of these people that they also become part of School District 150.

IV. Conclusions

The annexation campaign in Peoria is a most striking example of an issue that was innovated, planned, and implemented by a group of the most prestigious men in town. It is a clear-cut case of the predominant position of an economic and professional elite group, who consciously mobilized middle-level community activists in the service of goals agreed upon in the private councils of the elite group. Structurally, one finds a monolithic power pyramid very similar to that which Floyd Hunter reports upon in his analysis of Atlanta, Georgia.

According to Hunter, the Atlanta group was continually active, well-informed, rationally organized, and politically astute. Thus, it is not structurally but procedurally that the Peoria situation differs markedly from what Hunter claims for Atlanta. Upon analysis of the actual workings and motives of the

Peoria elite group when it attempted to exercise power, one finds sporadic activity, internal conflict, and political miscalculation. This group of notables had the resources, reputation, and organizational skills to instigate and facilitate a complex campaign to annex to the central city an area that would almost have tripled the area contained within the city limits. But when an explosive situation arose, the group pulled back without bringing these enormous resources to bear in any significant way. The reasons why this happened shed much light upon community elite participation in general.

First, it might be observed that elite groups do not understand or tolerate political conflict well. In part, this is because of their experience in the private occupational sphere. Since within their economic enterprises policy is often made by upper-echelon coordinating committees operating in a climate of agreement over goals, they transfer this image of decision-making to their community service activities. They therefore define their own civic involvement in terms of benevolent service, rationally organized and easily programmed in advance. When deep differences over goals or unanticipated events arise, they produce confusion and tend to be enervating. It took little more than the suggestion that H.B. 1063 might be unconstitutional to induce the parent committee to call a halt.

The elite may unwittingly create unexpected opposition because, in their social isolation from citizens living in different circumstances, they project attitudes that are special to their own circumstances. In the case of annexation, the elite group seems to have miscalculated the desires and attitudes of most Richwoods residents. For example, a major problem interconnected with the school issue was that of the property tax burden. The members of the Urban-Suburban Relations Committee knew that the taxes they paid to run their own school systems were relatively high, compared with city school taxes, but they

assumed that most Richwoods citizens shared their view that the high quality of the suburban schools was worth the extra cost. It is the contention of several officers of the Citizens Committee, who actually executed the annexation drive, that this assumption may hold only for upper-income groups, and that the majority of Richwoods residents, who have average incomes, would welcome the tax relief of not having the burden of small, independent school systems. Moreover, given the fact that Peoria city taxes were higher than Richwoods Township taxes, it was argued that offering the compensation of decreasing school costs was the only way of alleviating the financial difficulties of tax-conscious homeowners. Therefore, the Citizens Committee was critical of the assumptions about taxes and suburban attitudes that undergirded the strategy of the parent committee.

Of course, miscalculation is not a trait operating only among the notables of the community. What gives its effects significance is that the elite do not wish to be involved in civic conflict at all. Much of the reason for the Peoria elite's involvement with annexation was for the public claiming of status. Status is best claimed in unambiguous terms in issues of a non-controversial nature. It is significant here to note that several notables on the parent committee now evidence a distaste for the whole annexation program, not so much because of its failure as because of their becoming involved in the first place.

Finally, many of the suburban elite were involved in a specifically ambiguous situation when they were forced to take a stand on annexation. A number of people who were public supporters of annexation were in their private lives ensconced in special status attributes connected to controlling their own political destinies. They were not really sure whether they wanted annexation or not.

CHAPTER 4

EVERYDAY POLICY: OPEN OCCUPANCY IN PUBLIC HOUSING

Description and analysis of the reform movement and the attempted drive for metropolitan political integration demonstrate the bedrock of political disengagement which is common to middle-sized cities. The reform movement illustrates the manner in which the ideas and values that lead to intense community involvement undercut, at the same time, the possibility for enduring and programmatic community concern. The annexation drive is a clear example of the caution and ambiguity of elite political orientation as representative of middle-class politics in general. In both these cases, the question of who makes decisions is less important than the beliefs and attitudes which characterize the dominant civic men on the community scene. Two groups are clearly identifiable at this stage of the analysis - a small band of middle-level activists who appear prepared to act in any civic venture and a core of the business elite who periodically become engaged in civic projects. The middle-level activists are the only group which has any continuing liking for public life and is sensitive to any new ideas that may improve the community's future. This group recognizes the necessity for elite participation in civic projects and the difficulty in prodding the elite into activity. Thus, the activists perceive themselves as being dependent upon elite influence in order to accomplish anything. Moreover, the originality of the activists' ideas is usually limited by training, background, and everyday contacts. Except for some professionals, their lives are local, immediate, and concrete, lacking reference to the problems and programs affecting other communities in the nation.

Reform and annexation precipitated major upheavals in the community political process. These events by their very difference from the ordinary run of community affairs play up the absence of an enduring decision-making structure.

A metropolitan area of 200,000 people, however, is a complex entity which demands official caretakers if only to pave the streets, to protect the citizens, or to educate the children. The middle-sized community presents the analyst with an array of official political bodies - some autonomous and some overlapping in jurisdiction, some multifunction and other single function. In looking at the activities of one branch of government, in a complex area of changing need, one can get a clear picture of the social types participating in public problems and the ideas and values by which they act or fail to act. Since lack of decision is most characteristic of power in smaller cities, one must follow a series of acts performed by this particular agency in order to sum up its general orientation toward its job.

Like most cities, Peoria has taken advantage of the aid offered by the Federal Government for construction of public housing for low-income people. As originally formulated by the Federal Government, the public housing program was most interested in widening the pool of housing possibilities for the poor and not interested in wider problems of welfare and social opportunity. The administration of the housing was to be done at the local level and fairly specific financial and technical requirements were the only major concern of the Federal Government. The fact that such a program was to be locally administered provided authorities with the opportunity to broaden the base of its activities with the poor if they so desired.

Three public housing projects have been built in Peoria, the earliest in 1941 and the latest in 1954. They are administered by an autonomous unit of local government called the Housing Authority. The Authority consists of five executive board members appointed by the mayor for five year terms. An executive director is appointed by the board. There has been very little turnover

in the board since its inception in that initial appointment usually leads to reappointment. The present executive director has been the chief administrator from the beginning. Although the board usually has one labor leader, the bulk of its members are either established lawyers or middle and upper management personnel of large economic enterprises. Like most boards of this type, it, therefore, has a pronounced "business" flavor.

One of the specific problems of a social nature which has confronted the Peoria Housing Authority is that of open occupancy. Agitation about civil rights on the national scene has had its repercussions at the local level. Increasingly during the twenty or more years of service, the Housing Authority has been pressed by Negro and human relations groups to enforce a non discriminatory policy in public housing. An analysis of the manner by which the Housing Authority faced the issue will exemplify the general features of power found in the everyday caretakers of government in the middle-sized community.

Only since World War II has the problem of racial residential segregation become a central urban concern. The increasing Negro urban migration and its concomitant militancy for civil rights are the major reasons for the concern. Up until this time, a combination of folk belief, real estate ethic, and official government policy had supported the growing racial segregation in the housing field in American cities. Until questioned by recent critique, theory, and research, it was considered a self-evident proposition that the races cannot or will not mix without adverse effect to life and property. Thus, in the sphere of public housing, Federal policy often supported the real estate code which stated that "inharmonious elements" should not occupy the same neighborhood. The local administration of public housing seldom contravened Federal

policy in this regard and almost all public housing projects were occupied,
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 until after the war, on a segregated basis. Peoria did not differ from this
 national pattern and its first two projects built in the forties made segre-
 gation an official administrative policy.

Public housing in general has been viewed in Peoria as in most American
 cities as a necessary evil. Since there was a definite housing shortage until
 the last decade and since private real estate business cannot build profitable
 housing for low income people, some public housing has been begrudgingly accept-
 ed. Because of this antipathy, public housing has often been viewed as a
 temporary phenomena which will disappear as soon as expansion of economic
 opportunities makes low-rent housing unnecessary. The need and demand for each
 new project is viewed with alarm by almost all groups in a community. When
 Peoria was forwarding an urban renewal proposal in 1960, the most commonly
 voiced fear involved the possibility that it would bring more public housing.
 Not only realty people who have obvious economic reasons, but the community in
 general accepts public housing with great reluctance. In some obvious symbolic
 sense, the presence of public housing represents an image of the failure of the
 American economy to fulfill its promise of abundance to all of its citizens.
 It has been difficult to admit that poverty is endemic rather than temporary.
 The long rows of drab gray or drab red brick which set off a public housing
 project from its environs conjures up the same sentiment of societal failure
 as do other public institutions like prisons or mental hospitals. Thus, for
 most people in the community, the existence of public housing as an institutional

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This ~~almost complete~~ acceptance of federal policy is itself a symptom of
 the dearth of local ideas in pressing social problems. The recent change in
 federal policy was a result of Negro militancy and social science research,
 not a result of local demand.

place for the poor is a fact about which they would rather not be reminded.

Two important facts, which have direct relevance for the problem of open occupancy, devolve from the negative image of public housing. In the first place, a pariah-group quality defines public housing residents as politically impotent. Their poverty and its attendant lack of education make public housing residents a mute element in the community political arena. Moreover, their insulation from the rest of the community means that no one else speaks for them either. Thus, the decision to continue or to discontinue a policy of segregation in public housing did not take into consideration as a political force the opinions or attitudes of its residents. In the second place, appointed members of the Housing Authority are almost completely ignorant concerning public housing when they enter the board. Their own generally negative attitude does not lead to any identification of their interests and sentiments with those of the public housing residents. Thus, any continuation of a policy of segregation on the grounds of prejudice by the Housing Authority is highly unlikely. Even if its members were against interracial living for themselves in their own neighborhoods, this would appear to have little effect in their attitude toward public housing residents. Because of these factors, the decision to integrate public housing would have been a relatively easy one. The fundamental question to ask is why they did not make this decision for many years.

A bedrock of caution characterizes the man of public affairs in the middle-sized community. Segregation in public housing continued, because like many other accomplished facts, no one complained about it. There is evidence that

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at least two members of the Housing Authority had liberal sentiments about open occupancy but made no case for it as long as everything appeared to be running smoothly. Membership on a public board like most civic ventures is very secondary to the primary occupational demands of life. Even if a board member has a pet policy of change, a rare occurrence, he has little time to develop or pursue it. Not one of the Housing Authority members actively volunteered for the job. They were approached by the incumbent mayor, usually because of campaign favors rendered, to take the position as a public honor and accepted it reluctantly. Being a member of a public board usually takes little time or energy. Meetings of the Housing Authority take place at a monthly two-houring luncheon. Special meetings are sometimes called two or three other times during the year. The chairmanship is occupied on a rotating yearly basis and his job involves little else than signing checks. Most of the day-to-day affairs of the Authority are managed by its Executive Director. Formal policy making is in the hands of the board, but the director's greater knowledge and involvement often make him the key decision-maker.

There has been more Negro militancy in Peoria than in many other northern cities its size, certainly more than in Springfield or Rockford. When the third and last public housing project was erected in 1954, it was taken for granted that the segregation policy which had continued since 1941 in the other projects would apply to the new project also. At the opening of this last project, however, the Peoria Council on Human Relations heard charges by

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The use of liberal in the context of this chapter does not refer to any comprehensive political philosophy but simply to positive sentiments and attitudes toward the more restricted problem of racial integration and welfare for the poor.

the NAACP against the Peoria Housing Authority concerning discrimination. The NAACP asked the City Council to enact legislation which would prohibit the practice of discrimination in public housing. The City Council informed the NAACP that the Housing Authority was an independent body over which it had no jurisdiction and that it could not pass open-occupancy ordinances anyway without enabling legislation from the state.

In the midst of this agitation, the labor leader who was one of the liberal members of the Authority was leaving the board and desired to forward racial integration before his departure. He conferred with the other liberal member and announced that he was going to propose an open-occupancy resolution. The other liberal agreed to second the motion for a resolution, and to their surprise, the resolution passed at the next meeting. At the adoption of the resolution, the executive director reacted strongly against its implementation. He claimed that there would be violence, that whites would move out, and that revenues would go down. The reaction of the board to the director's recommendations demonstrates how clearly the board's ignorance, its reluctance, and its respect for expertise all work to permit the professional to wield the major power in the Authority. The board immediately compromised and made its open-occupancy resolution applicable only to the new project. The new project integrated with absolutely no trouble, but segregation was the continued policy of the original two projects.

Stemming from this first public agitation over discrimination on public housing was an official justification by the Housing Authority of its existing racial policy. This statement made no attempt to deny the charges made against it and issued the following reasons for its segregation.

- a. the time was not right for integration
- b. an attempt to integrate an all-white project by moving Negro families into two units had to be abandoned because white families suddenly moved out
- c. forced integration was not a policy of the Housing Authority
- d. there was fear of a loss of revenue if Whites moved out of integrated projects
- e. because of greater Negro housing need, integration would lead to all-Negro projects anyway
- f. as much as the Housing Authority wished to see desegregation, it had to respect prejudice where it existed
- g. there was fear of violence if integration was pushed

That these reasons for justifying segregation are causes for its continuation and its reenforcement is amply documented by recent social science research on public housing. *

The Housing Authority's official statement was the work of its executive director. This professional's reaction to a potentially controversial problem is symptomatic of the activities of many professionals in the community political process. A description of this particular professional and an analysis of the features general to public professionals will add another important dimension to the processes of community power.

The public housing professional had been recruited for his job from private industry in 1941. He had had no formal training in the public housing

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See Morton Deutsch and Mary Evans Collins. Interracial Housing: A Psychological Evaluation of a Social Experiment, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1951, and Daniel M. Wilner, Rosabelle Price Walkley, and Stuart W. Cook, Human Relations in Interracial Housing, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955.

field if only because it was a new venture and no body of administrative principles had evolved for it. From the very beginning, in line with Federal policy which demands fairly rigid application to financial and technical criteria, the Housing Authority Director had proven himself an able administrator. He had developed the reputation of one who follows rules thoroughly, expects the same for his employess, and judges the success of public housing in terms of revenue, vacancies, and turnover. Basically, this professional ran things by the book and open occupancy was not in the book.

This acceptance of policy in terms of administration alone is common to the modern middle class and was mentioned in the Peoria reform issue as a central middle-class idea. Even the liberals on the board have always praised the professional's administrative competence. They did have some misgivings about his tendency to (1) be too much concerned with costs and too little concerned with human problems in public housing, and (2) be utterly inflexible with little tendency to apply regulations with qualifications as to individual cases. One of the former managers of a housing project had been in considerable conflict with the director when he attempted to treat the residents as people with problems rather than entries in a ledger. The possibility of treating public housing in a more comprehensive welfare manner had sometimes arisen at the instigation of welfare professionals, but had been resisted by the executive director on the grounds that new programs would cost money and put a heavier work load on his existing staff. Innovation, thus, did not emanate from the office of the executive director.

Community tradition had defined the housing professional's role as simply that of manager of low-cost apartments. This role was strengthened by restrictive federal regulations and by the detailed administrative review of the

budget by federal officials. Thus, even the rare liberal who felt some need for change in this role also saw change as peripheral rather than central and implicitly accepted the middle-class view that wider welfare (including interracial) measures were somewhat outside the usual sphere of public housing activities. Although liberals thought that the housing director could improve his performance by more emphasis on welfare, they also thought that, in the main, he did a fine job as administrator.

To the professional housing director, open occupancy was also an issue which was potentially conflictual and therefore defined as apart from his usual administrative tasks. When approached to change existing racial policy, his vision of ensuing conflicts led him to define change as detrimental to successfully fulfilling his professional obligations, i.e. he was against open occupancy on the grounds that it would lead to a high vacancy rate and low revenues. Like many public boards, the Housing Authority was more in the hands of its professional leadership than of its board members. The major cause of the open-occupancy crisis was, therefore, focused in the role of its executive director. A derivative of the general status involvement of board members with public housing was that, although they easily accepted the status quo, they could also have been moved to legitimate public housing integration. The innovation had to come from the professional housing administrator.

An understanding of the role of the professional in the specialized agencies of municipal administration is key to the problem of policy innovation. As a leader hired for his technical competence in a restricted area of activity, his role is formally defined as "non political", meaning that he is not supposed to transcend the bounds of utilizing the best means toward fulfillment of ends

proscribed by others. Since, however, in any concrete policy question, the means and ends are inextricably interwoven, it is never easy for the professional to be only an administrator. His access to the knowledge on the problem and the fact that no other person in the community can devote as much time or energy put the professional into a position of potential independence. On the other hand, the public professional, especially insecure in a position of uncertain tenure, is singularly vulnerable as far as independence of policy is concerned. In a smaller city like Peoria, this vulnerability is often translated into wariness. The racial integration issue is conceived to be controversial in most cities and the professional interested in keeping his job may believe that he is acquiescing to the prevailing mood when he supports a tradition of segregation. In many similar cases of integration in public housing in larger cities, the housing professional, who by obligation stands for universal standards and by training is aware of the knowledge about integration, has simply enforced integration as a matter of course. This was not the case in Peoria, where for occupational safety and convenience, the professional treated public housing as a business enterprise alone.

The Peoria Housing Authority continued its discriminatory practice in the original two housing projects even after the third project was successfully integrated. Fear of a high vacancy rate if integration was enforced in these two projects was the factual basis by which the executive director controlled the housing board. It must be repeated that, as always, the majority of the board was not averse to listening to such reasoning. In 1959, pressure for integration from the NAACP presented the Housing Authority with a petition demanding open occupancy in the segregated projects. The executive director re-

plied to this petition by stating that "basically, the Authority is not supposed to be a social pioneer but was set up to see that the low-cost housing projects are run successfully." This statement concorded well with the purely technical definition of his role.

The following two years were rife with NAACP demands, Housing Authority justifications, and attempts at negotiation by the Peoria Council on Human Relations. The most active liberal member of the Housing Authority began to work in close alliance with members of the human relations council. One human relations member especially played the professional role by providing the liberal with relevant materials on successful public housing integration in other cities. On the human relations council, the professional's role was defined as one which collected facts and offered community advice on paths toward racial integration. The public housing professional and the human relations professional were, thus, at cross purposes regarding the open-occupancy problem in public housing.

At this point in the community's racial history the importance of expertise which would assist racial integration was assuming a strategic political position. No significant power groups had ever demanded segregation in public housing. Its continuance as an aspect of tradition which averted controversy could not be justified since open conflict was now endemic on this issue. The Housing Authority desegregated one of the two segregated projects in 1961, and, under the chairmanship of its active liberal, passed a resolution in 1962 for complete open occupancy in all public housing. The President's executive order against segregation in public housing was passed at this time, and, although it did not apply to Peoria's housing, it helped fortify the Housing Authority's decision. As is true in most cities, public housing integration

proceeded with no mishaps and has now disappeared from the community's political agenda.

The decision-making process in the open-occupancy case demonstrates significant factors about the day-to-day exercise of power. The following statements summarize these factors.

1. A public board consisting of a few highly reputable citizens and a professional director can carry on its activities over many years time with almost no other community engagement with its affairs. Had the open-occupancy issue not arisen from NAACP demand, there would have been no local initiative to change the prevailing policy of segregation. This demand, emanating from a rather weak political force (the NAACP has few members in most middle-sized communities) created a condition of public controversy which appears to be the major fear of middle-class public boards. The first reaction of the board was to claim that the criticisms of its racial policy were unjustified. Basically, this was an attempt to vindicate and thus provide for the continuance of its past policy. When it was realized that conflict would only disappear if integration demands were met, then existing racial policy was changed. Liberal members of the Housing Authority were willing to change policy without public agitation but did not appear willing enough to break with the equilibrium of existing conditions.

2. The major predispositions of housing board members reflect their middle-class orientation toward public life. Civic involvement should not be sought out, should not be conflictual in nature, and should not demand too much of a time commitment from people busy in occupational affairs. Board members joined the Housing Authority with little interest in public housing. Men with many years experience on the board claimed to have changed very little in their

initial opinion of public housing residents and their problems. Moreover, a fundamental middle-class notion, reflected in the reform movement, is that all areas of public life are best managed by competent professionals. Therefore, the Housing Authority has always seen its role as a passive advisor and approver of the activities of its professional director as long as he does a good technical job. Even the one or two liberal humanitarians who have been on the board and have wanted racial integration on grounds of principle have been caught in the bind of this administrative notion. Their dissatisfaction with the director's job in human terms was neutralized by their acceptance of his job in technical terms.

3. The role of the professional in this issue indicates his key position in the day-to-day exercise of power. As a result of their lack of commitment and knowledge on one hand and their faith in professional expertise on the other, the members of the housing board consistently followed the lead of their executive director. The professional represents the authority of knowledge within the accepted rules of rationality and efficiency. His reference group is a body of national professionals and through this body, comparative knowledge and experience can be derived. In the public housing case, the professional's external reference group was also the federal government and its rules and regulations dovetailed with the community's traditional acceptance of a segregated racial policy. Theoretically, the professional could have defined his role to include racial integration as part of a plan for wider welfare measures but the structural conditions of a smaller community strongly limit this possibility. These conditions include incomplete professionalization in many public

spheres (leading to lack of a professional community at the local level), doubtful training and competence of existing professionals (many spheres are not yet included in university curricula and professionals of proven competence are more likely to be found in the more challenging atmosphere of the larger metropolis), and ready acceptance of circumscribed professional activities in the smaller community. The normative definition of a professional role in a middle-sized community involves acceptance of traditional community goals and fulfillment of them in an efficient and rational manner. One of these goals, emanating from the idea that conflict is bad, is to avoid policy which may lead to overt controversy. Anything new like racial integration or new welfare programs in public housing may stir up groups against these programs. The professional, thus, often channels his information and activities toward safer and technically proven avenues. The presence in the public housing case of professional roles which themselves conflicted (the roles of the executive director and human relations commission people) demanded some sort of a solution to resolve the conflict. The agitation which questioned the policy of one professional permitted the other professional to intervene and change policy. The racial issue is, in its way, a special case since it is at present a matter of national concern. In other spheres of potential community innovation, the combination of the passively, conservative board and the strictly technical professional who acts in its name usually insure that new ideas or programs will seldom arise on the community agenda.

CHAPTER 5

POWER WITHOUT COMMAND: THE INFLUENCE OF VALUES

The exercise of power as an overt, decisive, and enduring activity is an unusual occurrence in the smaller community. Stemming from the halting use of power is the realization that the processes of community power are not, as a rule, working toward conscious community change. If a system of power is assumed to exist and if it is not found to be a purposive instrument of social change, then it is logical to infer that power operates as a maintainer of things as they are. One cannot necessarily conclude from this that maintenance proceeds by either forceful suppression of groups demanding change or by conscious manipulation of the instruments of power. While suppression and manipulation are traditional techniques of social control, it is also possible that the limits of change be defined by an accepted body of beliefs or values. If all people in a social system believe in a set of values which circumscribe the possibilities of change, then the status quo can continue without "conspiracy against the people". Moreover, the privileges that accrue to some members of the population need not result from influence buying City Hall if the legitimacy of those privileges is unquestioned and if fully accepted ideas define the activities of City Hall as limited and unimportant. The community can be controlled by values which undermine the workings of public power and which define the major activities of life as something other than public service, public betterment, or public future.

A major idea was evolved during critique of former theory and was corroborated by data in the community -- the idea of a value system and its relation to power. In its most comprehensive sense, power may be defined as the domi-

nance of value. We are often accustomed in contemporary analysis to view power as competition between people or groups for the rewards that winning bring. This purely market system of power is not, however, without its rules and regulations nor without an underlying assumption about the value of competing for interest in the first place. The laissez faire individual interest model of power reflects a system in which competition for private gain is the dominant value orientation. Since gain is more important than anything else, it is possible that the rules that govern the struggle may be broken and force and fraud may prevail. Moreover, group or personal conflict may be rife with the overt use of the instruments of power - manipulation, bribery, violence, and sanctions in money, jobs, or votes. In the ideal-type system, however, the value of gain as the impetus and reason for power is unquestioned.

It is paradoxical that the importance of values in explaining the workings of a power structure is least evident when a unified, homogeneous system of values is working most smoothly. Moreover, it is at the time when value integration is most complete that the group at the apex of a power system may, again paradoxically, have command without commanding, rule without ruling, and possess power without articulate or even conscious use of that power. In an earlier America characterized by more basic economic and ethnic cleavages, the presence of openly conflicting groups made the power problem quite manifest. Given the predominantly economic character of American society, value dissensus had a peculiarly market emphasis which made interest value dominant. The model which presents power as a prize resulting from competing interest groups was a model which reflected the earlier American community quite well. There, one finds conscious, deliberative vying for power by groups of varying interest. The model stresses rationality, power consciousness, resources needed to win, political organization, etc.

But as the American community has changed toward value homogeneity, toward emphasis on stability, toward overall middle-class assimilation, toward a homogeneous national culture, the competition of interest groups using power as an instrument for economic advancement has become, at least at the local level, less evident. Instead, we see the growth of a value system which eschews formal power, which has power while not fully recognizing its use or its possibilities. It is now inaction rather than action, inability or unconsciousness of political resources, abnegating rather than striving for power which has to be explained. Only by an analysis of the set of values which define the exercise of power as suspect and disreputable can the peculiar paradox of modern community power be understood.

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At least three systems of power emerge as theoretical possibilities in communities. Each type represents the functional dominance of different sets of value.

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Much of the discussion about how much power business possesses is framed in terms of the potential for the independent power base of formal government. Thus, those cities in which political parties or machines are rooted in constituencies, usually of a class or ethnic nature, which are separate from business elites would be systems where political power is in direct or indirect conflict with business power. Although the economy and the polity may, in most cases, be differentially organized and structurally independent, this in no way precludes the possibility of an evaluative overlap between the economic and political systems. Periodic conflict between business and government is symptomatic of the independent power basis of government only when government represents a system of ideas in contradiction to the prevailing business system, a state of affairs more easily proven by wider comparative analysis across national lines. However, whatever disparity and conflict does exist in the American community is more true of the large metropolis where heterogeneity presents the politician with varying power resources. The smaller city, like Peoria, is more homogeneous structurally and ideologically and seldom does one find politicians in overt conflict with business. For a recent classification of potential business-government relationships, see Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics, Harvard University Press and the M.I.T. Press, 1963, p. 272-276.

1. The Type I system emphasizes individual competition for economic reward. Economic power and political power are similar in outlook and in processes. Power appears to be something attached to individuals who use it or who seek it for stability or change of private status alone. Political or public power is privatized, sometimes corrupt, and produces no ideology of overall community development.

2. The Type II system emphasizes individual competition for private advancement within a universalized, rationalized and circumscribed system of ideas. Power seldom appears in overt form, as it resides in the administered control of personnel and resources found in the large successful economic enterprise. Political power is rationalized, made efficient and individually honest while being defined and defining itself as limited and unimportant.

3. The Type III system emphasizes a conscious use or quest for public power by groups or persons demanding community change. The historical improbability of this type on the American community scene puts many of the aspects of this system in the realm of theoretical speculation and political desire.

In actuality, the middle-sized American community demonstrates the long-term dominance of the individual market system with a significant tendency toward the second more bureaucratic type. The small American community of, say 1910, was probably the most complete embodiment of the thoroughgoing Type I system. Business was small and more dispersed, new immigrant and ethnic groups were streaming into the urban community, and urban services were not yet so complex as to demand any great change in the style in which they were fulfilled. In this 1910 city, the economic elite ruled more openly for the sake of economic reward and the polity, usually representing illiterate and uneducated masses, was often available for a price. Money flowed from business into the polity;

favors in the form of contracts flowed from the politicians to business and in patronage jobs from the politician to his constituency; and votes flowed from the new immigrants to the politician. The polity could often be directly controlled by powerful economic interest, but could also at times threaten these interests by representing constituencies rejecting economic power. Thus, conflict between power groups representing different values could theoretically arise although the market system was usually predominant.

The privatized power system with an economic elite directly holding sway has changed to a more publically oriented system. The smaller city and the large metropolis have witnessed a like growth in huge, rationally organized enterprises dominating their economic structure. The managers of these enterprises are nationally oriented in outlook, have little to gain from direct control of the local polity, and are more interested in their city as a place to live rather than as a place to make money. The older American idea of individual economic advancement remains, but in the context of making a bureaucratic career, not in the individualistic competition of the marketplace. Moreover, the retardation, since 1924, of immigration has led to the assimilation of most of the earlier immigrants into modern society as middle-class employees. The migrant Negroes, coming into the large cities in recent times, represent perhaps the only major impetus to old-fashioned politics with its Adam Clayton Powells on the one hand and James Baldwins on the other; but the number of Negroes in the smaller cities is not great enough to make any significant impact on the political scene.

What are the major value premises, as expressed by actors themselves, which define power and its processes in middle-sized cities? The value changes wrought by middle-class homogenization have still left residues of older pre-

mises in these communities, especially in the poorer districts. This older set of values include the following:

1. Life is viewed as a tough, competitive game in which softness and idealism are only for the weak or the irresponsible. Politicians are more to be trusted if they accept human vices as natural and do not indulge in phrases about reform and better government. The politician that is known may be corruptible, but his corruptibility makes him human and understandable. The respect for the politician involves the respect for success no matter how it is reached.

2. Politics should be specific, personal and direct. If the politician is not, in some way, defined as a member of one's own group, then he is seen as a member of the opposition. Reform or middle-class politicians are not viewed in in-group terms and are considered members of the brass or the men upstairs. Whatever the other people or those with money want in a political way is probably against one's own group or personal interests. (This negativity is one of the major factors in explaining why lower-class wards vote down bond issues for schools or fire equipment. They vote "no" to the whole political process even in these cases where they have most to benefit from the passing of the bond issues. Negation of politics can be more basically expressed by not voting at all.)

3. Government money is seen as one's own money in someone else's hands. It is to be used for direct and tangible benefit. Any use of that money for changes which do not result in immediate benefits is pie-in-the-sky. (This is another underlying reason for the difficulties in passing referenda in smaller cities. This premise also remains part of much lower-middle class voting since the tax pinch is felt very strongly among insecure middle-class people.)

The highly personalized and quasi-feudal regimes that result from the dominance of these values are now residual to most middle-sized cities. Eroding its place are new middle-class ideas which destroy the structural roots of government in ward or locality, in ethnicity or other smaller grouping. The organizational changes in government toward rationalized staffing of municipal employment, toward community wide agencies, toward nonpartisan, at-large elections are all the result of the newer political ethos. Civil service commissions, planning boards, and general professionalization dovetail quite nicely with the dominance of the values of a corporate elite and its white collar technicians. Middle-class politics is most overt during reform movements, but its values remain uniform and recognizable during periods with little reform agitation.

1. A good politician is a good man. He does not represent long-range program and eschews formal attempts to build political organization behind him. This good politician is one who accepts existing social institutions as good and is honest, sincere, and efficient about managing existing municipal service. He is a man who would rather remain in private economic life, but reluctantly accepts the burdens of politics out of a sense of social responsibility.

2. A good government is a good business. It keeps honest books and gets as much out of its personnel at the lowest cost. Trust in expertise and technical know-how leads to the hiring of professional people in as many municipal spheres as possible. Although government must always be watched to make sure that it spends wisely, the professional's knowledge about his own sphere of competence probably makes him the best judge of the desired level of expenditures.

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These same things are seen by the people of the old style as abstract entities which take government out of the hands of the people.

3. The local community must be made into a pleasant and safe place to live. The appearance, amenities and services of a community must justify the reliance on local initiative and responsibility. Therefore, expansion of some governmental activities to meet new needs at the local level is good. Higher taxes and bond issues which increase present expenditures for the improvement of community services are worthwhile.

4. There may be some things wrong with the community but problems are being progressively alleviated. This is one of the finest cities in the nation and it will remain that way as long as "politicians" don't run the town all over again. (This is the major premise in opposition to old-style politics and asserts the right of nonpolitical good citizens to run the government).

Although the two value systems are in particular opposition on some points, there are underlying ideas which integrate them into the general American set of values regarding power and its use. Government operations are run differently when men representing these different values are in power and the social cleavage symbolizing differential value emphasis remains, but these differences do not represent basic value conflict. Type I and Type II values integrate into more abstract and universal themes of the following type:

1. Politics is a dirty game which, when indulged in for long periods of time, is proof of definite character flaws like greed, lust for power, or duplicity. Good people can only be sullied by too much involvement with politics. The major value is therefore the converse of this. It is better to devote oneself to activities of a non political nature. The whole political process is to be fundamentally distrusted.

2. Economic life is the measure of a person's dignity. Public interest ideology or altruistic dedication to community welfare should not be full-time occupations. (Type I politics being less interested in respectability defines politics as an economic game and treats altruism with skepticism. Type II politics attempts to circumscribe politics in administration and accepts the sincerity of public service, but only if a man has already proven himself in the marketplace.)

Thus, the growing dominance of the new politics has not yet resulted in changing the characteristic American imbalance between economic and political institutions. Public life is still suffused with "economic" ideas and is still not a respected sphere of human endeavor. But the hegemony of Type II values has resulted in a paradox in the smaller community. The rough and tumble politics of an earlier era is replaced by a smooth, formalized and non-conflictual type. The workings of power were more overt in the earlier system. In today's community, problems are solved by a more bureaucratic administration without the representatives of dominant values coming into play at all. Decisions, negotiations, and other processes of power disappear in the context of rationalized administration. The economic elite have always been the social models of the dominant values of the community. The earlier dispersed and competitive elite was forced to make political decisions, often for economic reasons and often because its legitimacy might be questioned by the militancy of the dispossessed. The modern concentrated and corporate elite does not need to make political decisions since public life is in the hands of a middle class completely encompassed by similar values.

The dominance of Type II values is what gives the community its general appearance of serenity and demonstrates the absence of decision as more important

than the making of decision. For example, reform and annexation in Peoria are ripples in the calm of the community political process. They are the catclysmic events which assist the observer in ascertaining the structure and process of decision-making; but the way in which these events occur exemplify the values which dominate the community in the long periods between such events. During these longer spans, elected officials and appointed agencies fulfill the everyday functions of government within the rubric of the same values.

The workings of formal government support the view that government does not recognize itself as an autonomous, public sphere. This disengagement from its own political possibilities is manifested by the strong sense in city council that it is the overall servant of the public. Most councilmen are prepared to cater to numerous and sundry demands periodically arising on the council floor. Spot zoning, change of off-street parking facilities, and responses to street repair needs are only a few of the many examples which are brought to the attention of city councils. These demands, moreover, are almost
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never refused. Proposals to deal with major community development needs -

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In the context of government being defined as the servant of the people, some of the older emphasis of government as the greater servant of economic privilege can result, although less often than in the past. It must be realized that governmental acquiescence to an organized downtown corporation which is asking condemnation of land is of a somewhat different order from acquiescence to a person wanting a hydrant fixed. The kinds of potential rewards and potential consequences to the community encompassed in organized economic demands are far greater than those resulting from the multitude of desires of private citizens. Concentrated economic demands have status and organization behind them whereas private citizens often do not. Government may appear to be serving all while serving some more than others. As a rule, however, it is lack of opposition to anything private influence wants to do, rather than corruption of City Hall which is most characteristic of modern government. ✓

housing, transportation, race relations - seldom, if ever, arise in city council. Curiously enough, the only sign of government autonomy would be the growth of a public interest ideology which, on the grounds of public duty, would refuse and reject specific demands of segments of the community (something like this already occurs in Britain where after one is elected, one is expected to rule.). In the American community, such behavior would be considered recalcitrant, undemocratic and downright unfriendly. The result is that city council meetings have a ritualized quality in which Type I politicians conflict with Type II good citizens on grounds that appear to make no great difference to the community. Neither side has any desire to assert public claim to the corporate future.

The problem of value systems and their relation to power is closely connected to a major theoretical question - the question of legitimacy. The analysis of legitimacy asks the reasons that certain people are obeyed rather than others. On what grounds can it be expected that certain commands or lack of commands will set the ground rules for most people in the social system? In our discussion of values that define power and its workings, we are really discussing the body of accepted rules that justify the obedience of most people. The major substantive problem in the middle-sized community revolves around the fact that there are twin systems of legitimacy which have had changes in their interrelationship during the present century. These two types may be called constitutional legitimacy or that which claims the power of the vote and status legitimacy or that which claims the power of economic position. These two types of legitimacy relate to the structural distinction between political authority and economic influence.

Success in the marketplace has been and continues to be the major avenue of legitimation in the American community. Therefore, those people who have reached the top in the economic sphere derive power from embodying the completion of legitimate value. These economic models, first the free-wheeling entrepreneurs and now the high-level corporate managers, occupy the most prestigious positions in the community. More concrete instruments of power are also derived from their fulfillment of major community values. These sources include:

1. Control of and access to large supplies of capital, both their own and others.
2. Control, through authority over large enterprises, over a great number of personnel.

Thus far, we have simply repeated a sociological truism. Status, wealth, and power are strongly connected and are defined by the values accepted as legitimate by most members of a community. As such, however, this tells us very little about the workings of power since we are referring by this formula only to potential power (which is nonetheless "real"). Complexities appear when the economic source of legitimacy and the constitutional source interact and when the economic values which define the political process as illegitimate are recognized.

Government is defined by the value system as a secondary, in some cases disreputable, form of activity. This definition of government is not confined to successful business alone, but is found throughout the community and is accepted by government itself. People from lower-class backgrounds have never been stopped, on this account, from entering government but this is because the private rewards in income and status that derive from political life are

often greater for poorer persons than the rewards that devolve from their life chances in the private marketplace. For lower-income people, politics may be disreputable, but measured against the repute of their social situations, political struggle may indeed be worth the effort. This is not so for the modern social elite and its middle-class followers. The disreputability of politics is the underlying premise of their civic involvement or lack of it. The occupational life of the modern middle and upper class is a rationalized and administered one. Conflict and controversy is seldom overt in organizations where goals are clearly defined and where jobs and obligations are rationalized according to procedures of scientific management. But political life is defined by inchoate goals, conflicting goals and shifting situations of potential controversy. Therefore, the economic elite and the middle-class employee are hesitant about tarnishing a spotless reputation earned in the pursuit of private occupation. Even during the reform movement, when political passions were engaged, candidates for public office were virtually impossible to find. Except for uncontroversial civic ventures like the United Fund or the Park Board, we do not find respectable citizens openly volunteering for many of the numerous boards and commissions in the community.

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A recent study takes a similar view of businessmen in power. "Businessmen gain the bulk of their material and psychological satisfactions, not unexpectedly, from acting like businessmen. To engage at all intensively in politics, they have to be prepared to shift time, always a precious resource, away from their business concerns and social activities and invest it in an alien and remote world of intrigue, controversies, and crises that they do not quite understand... No businessman wants to get hauled into any dispute if it will reflect adversely on his organization, as it almost always does. He can acquire the credentials of 'good citizenship' and 'public leadership' merely by making sonorous pronouncements endorsing largely uncontested goals already formulated for him by politicians' eager to trade on his esteem and social position." (p. 182, Benjamin Walter, 'Political Decision Making in Arcadia', p. 141-183, in F. Stuart Chapin, Jr., and Shirley F. Weiss, Urban Growth Dynamics in a Regional Cluster of Cities, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York and London, 1962.)

The irony of the dominance of economic values and their elite representatives is that these values do not assure civic success when the elite does get involved in civic projects. Since public life is devalued, a power vacuum is created which can be filled by men of little formal power if they possess a high degree of political artistry. ^{*} Thus, the elite often assures itself of defeat by its reluctant involvement in politics and saps government of its political energy by defining its activities in a limited or circumscribed way.

In summary, political authority or that authority which results from legitimization by the electorate, has been alternatively a privatized sphere and an administrative sphere with definite movement in the latter direction. In our recent past, when privatized government is predominant, those people who devote themselves completely to the building of constituencies and, with open desire take power, degrade themselves and their activities. Moreover, their concrete political activities, when in power, involve practical adjustment to exigencies in order to keep power rather than application of abstract ideas for the purpose of social change. The process of privatized government is the arbitration of power to keep power. Power brings rewards to those who have not or cannot make it in the marketplace. The greatest fear is losing power. Privatized government practices adjustment politics. When, however, private government sullies the community too much, then more respectable power may intervene to put the stamp of good manners on government. Nothing more. This lasts only as long as the moral outrage lasts and this outrage is not too strong in the first place.

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In the Type I era this was done by the master politician. In today's system the vacuum can be filled by the extremely rare middle-level activist and the also rare politically sophisticated professional. An interesting and unanswered research question is how to explain presence of these atypical characters.

With a change toward more administrative government in accordance with modern economic ideals, the direct influence of economic demand upon government recedes and the whole political system becomes suffused with ideas of non government. The essence of the earlier system was conflict and negotiation; the essence of the contemporary system is non conflict and smooth-running efficiency. Whereas the absence of autonomous government in the first case is due to the potential purchase of City Hall by economic influence, the lack of dedicated government in the modern style is due to its complete envelopment by the ideas of business enterprise. Privatized government, especially in the big cities, presents the possibility of politicians with stable constituency paeserving a semblance of independence from influence. In the smaller city, no such stability ever exists and the urban complex is small enough to conceive of the possibility of centralized administration of all of its needs. The predominance of the middle class in the smaller city leads to the greater acceptance of the newer political style as a completed and fully rationalized system.

CHAPTER 6

Conclusion

Although the politics of the middle-sized city exhibits, at times, characteristics that approximate both the Hunter and Dahl models, the following statements can be made regarding summations of the total political system:

1. It is not just a centrally organized body of highly-placed economic dominants who consciously formulate policy and allocate responsibility to middle-class "legmen".

2. It is not just a selection of individuals from all social strata who demonstrate their potential for power when private interests are either stimulated or threatened.

The truth of the first point has been demonstrated in the previous chapters. There is no fully organized plutocracy existing as an articulate entity at all times, conscious of its power, and certain of its control of the community agenda. This sort of a decision-making entity emerges at times, e.g. in the annexation issue, but its organization is not enduring or stable and its lines of control and information are uncertain. Moreover, even when the Hunter pyramid exists, the impetus of its organization or the source of its innovative ideas often stem from a small body of professionals and middle-class activists. Reform in Peoria would not have taken place without the instigation of active J.C. members and the same people steered much of the course in annexation.

As to the second point, the structure of power appears neither spread among individuals throughout the community nor connected to the fulfillment of private interest alone. Men in top economic institutional positions have more power than men in low economic positions or than men in other institutions.

Prestige, legitimate wealth, and executive occupation assure position at the top of the community power pyramid. But the existence of a community power pyramid headed by an economic elite in no way assures a single pyramidal decision-making structure. Although the elite has more power than anyone else, it does not wield this in the community in the same way that it does in its economic organization. The single most interesting point about the most powerful men in the community is that they seldom make community decisions at all. The ideas which define their relation to the community create long periods of time during which the absence of a decision-making structure is the characteristic political temper.


When decisions on active issues do arise, a large array of persons is not characteristically involved. A small number of men, usually of middle-and upper-status positions is found in whatever civic project evolves. Seldom do they partake in these projects for the sake of private gain. Finally, although the middle-level activists in such projects recognize the greater power of the elite, especially for the purpose of public legitimation and financial backing, they do not always recognize any greater active leadership qualities in the elite. The elite consists of men with great power but with reluctance to lead; this reluctance often creates a power vacuum which can be filled with men of perhaps less formal power, but of less hesitancy also.

The perusal of some of the major issues fully corroborates the utility of the conceptions of power forwarded in an earlier section. Power is structured in institutions rather than persons, involves maintenance and control as well as change and decision-making, must be studied in historical depth to be fully understood, and is legitimated by commonly accepted value systems. This view widens our vision of community power by sensitizing us to factors often

obscured by recent conceptual outlooks. For example, much of the modern analysis of community power emphasizes the idea that the structure of power is conterminous with the structure of decision-making. Accustomed as we are to seeing power being wielded in a rationalistic manner in the context of bureaucratic organization, we often assume that this is the universal context of power. The "decision-making model" implicitly assumes that power is revealed by the knowledgeable actions of men working openly toward the fulfillment of goals and rationally calculating the risks and rewards of other alternatives.

Moreover, this bureaucratic emphasis visualizes the structure of power as an organized entity possessing collectively recognized positions of command and obedience. However, each of our community issues demonstrates power as something often seen in men not taking action or taking action without knowledge or without realization of goals or alternatives. Power can involve lack of decisions as well as the making of them. To equate power with decisions is to exclude the all-important fact that men can have power which sets the limits of action for other men or which defines alternatives accepted without the need of fiat. Basically power can exist through acquiescence rather than obedience and this dimension appears most important in the American community. ✓

The assumptions of the decision-making model also involve the idea that concrete decisions made at one time and one place signify the workings of power. If power is not present without concrete decisions arising, the discovery of communities where few decisions are made often leads the analyst to finding no system of power in the community. Essentially, this is one of the pluralist dilemmas since that outlook assumes that there is no power without decision. But if power exists by acquiescence without decision or in a series



of events, some decisive, some indecisive, and some taken for granted, then the view of power must be broadened to include more than the decision-making process.

Another and equally important assumption of current conception is the idea that the apex of power is demonstrated by its successful resolution of issues. If a group or individual in power fails to bring an issue to successful resolution, it is assumed that another competing power group or individual has interceded. Moreover, this intercession proves that the original power holders are not quite as powerful in making the community bend to their will as would be the case if there were no competing power groups. This outlook stresses and usually discovers power as revealed in the competition of numerous "interest groups". It views the process of power in terms of competing groups, of which the success of one constitutes proof of its greater power. But if we look at the Peoria situation, we see that power can be revealed by its lack of success. This lack of success, moreover, is not due to other power groups in the community but to processes internal to the group with power. It can only be seen by analyzing the ideals, attitudes and outlooks of power groups rather than attempting to discover an arena of competing interests. Thus, our analysis demonstrates the possibility that men can be in power, yet not successfully use it, for the following reasons:

1. Due to the prevailing value system, which the economic leaders most clearly represent, the elite is hesitate and ambiguous about involvement in public issues. The effort to avoid potential controversy undergirds the other reasons for the elite's failure. Avoiding conflict is the most obvious result of valuing private economic position and its attendant problems while devaluing the problems of the polity. In a sense, the elite accepts failure in

any public issue in order to prove that it should not have been involved in the first place. Numerous interviews with economic leaders, after civic projects have failed, manifest an "I told you so" disgruntlement with the whole political process. Only by understanding this system of beliefs can one make sense out of fact that men of long management experience in economic life can show so little organizational ability in political action. For example, the actions of economic notables in public issues indicate the following characteristics:

a. They may not have a clear view of means and ends. (In the annexation issue, the economic elite that led the movement was vague and undefined as to exactly what it wanted and, therefore, how to get it. Although the desire for annexation, as part of the programmatic activities of the Chamber of Commerce, was clear, the concrete strategies of the problem - inclusion vs. exclusion of schools, the future of existing special districts, tax considerations - were never fully incorporated into an articulated and systematic program.)

b. They may not manage other groups or individuals in the most efficacious manner. (In the annexation movement, the elite's management of the citizen's group led to a disruption in organization. The elite had little knowledge of or connection to the suburban residents to whom annexation was directed. In the reform movement, the elite had very limited relation to the other groups involved.)

c. They may be internally incoherent, i.e., they may lack form, organization, and connection among themselves. (In annexation the overt elite involvement was characterized by inner divisiveness. Elite involvement with reform occurred as disparate individuals rather than as a group.

The open-occupancy problem, except for members of the housing board, saw no elite engagement at all.)

Community power analysis also cannot assume that the community is a social unit autonomous to itself and therefore theoretically capable of having a power group within it that has wide range of latitude for community change. The modern urban community is (1) intrinsically a part of a larger societal framework, (2) is limited legally by restrictions of the state, and (3) is limited in its own potential resources for change. Given this state of affairs, it is absurd to expect any community power group, regardless of its rationality, political sense, coherence, or dedication, to be successful within any but a demarcated range of possibilities. Many of the problems now facing communities can approach solution only by community leaders becoming aware of programs and possibilities stemming from the activities of units external to the community. Analysts of community power must also be aware of these external agents of change. As a social unit, the community must be seen in a wider setting as having a limited pool of possibilities. A group can be at the apex of community power without having complete power over that community. Unless one is aware of this, much of the failure of strictly local action which is seen in terms of local power processes may better be seen in terms of the limits of local power itself.

There is also a major substantive reason why the problem of local power must be sensitive to the incorporation of community ideas into national perspective. Many of the ideas found in the middle-sized community have their roots in the national political culture. It is one of the paradoxes of power in American society that no one wants to see it. The historical origins of present power

are related to the overthrowing of a centralized autocracy during America's revolutionary period. Stemming from this and concomitant with nineteenth century laissez-faire economics were the mistrust of the overt use of power (the ideas of checks and balances and the importance of individual protection from the power of public authority are examples of this) and the belief that power is always used for private gain. Perhaps nowhere else is Lord Acton's dictum more cherished than on the American scene. Rather than viewing public authority as a potential developer and reenforcer of individual rights and possibilities, Americans see it as a danger to individual enterprise. In America, the dichotomy between the state and the individual has developed to its starkest intensity. In the twentieth century, although large and complex hierarchical organizations have arisen, the growth of "friendly", "administered" authority buttressed by the sentimentality of "public relations" has obfuscated the workings of power. The rise of large government in response to great need is viewed with a jaundiced eye, always as a threat rather than an opportunity. Thus, it is not too surprising that Americans see their system as working at its best without power revealing itself. Dahl, for example, never asks whether the low percentage of voting turnout is good or bad for democracy, but simply goes ahead to explain why it is good. Implicitly, since a low voting turnout signifies little public interest in power and since vying for power is a dangerous thing, low turnout must automatically be good. It is because of this American outlook and the modern research which reflects it that rather commonplace things have to be reiterated here. To assert for example, that power exists



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(not in any ontological sense) in a structure way, is an important initial assumption for community power structure analysis to make.

The middle-sized city has been used as a springboard for the development of a more fruitful conception of power. The narrative account of issues and values has mainly emphasized the dimensions of power and pointed toward what factors are meaningfully related to power in the community. From the elucidation of drawbacks of recent conceptions of power and from the illustration of its workings in different issues, a more comprehensive and more useful posture toward power can now be stated. This use of data for predominantly definitional reasons has been warranted by the present state of power research. Future research can discover the utility of this conception of power on a wide variety of communities and theoretical statement relating power to other community factors can be propounded for validation. Since the statements elucidated in an earlier chapter (resulting from an analysis of the limitation of the two major contemporary "schools") have already dealt with dimensions of power and since, with some variation, the data do not basically alter the utility of this earlier scheme, it is natural that much of the following will be repetitious of former statements.

1. In any social unit, power is the institutionalized control over the mechanisms of maintenance or change. As a major source of social valuation, it is always found clustered around other highly valued things.

The resources of power involve the control over those things which are valued as access to power. In the modern community the major resources

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To have a system with power randomly distributed is to have no system at all. This is the classical Hobbesian state of nature, the ghost of which pluralism seems to have revived.



of power are wealth, status, control over information, and control over votes. In a strictly formal sense, only votes are the legitimate means to power, but in a wider social sense, it is fully recognized that institutionalized status and wealth are also mainsprings of power.

2. There are two major sources of power. One is through the control of the strictly constitutional resources of power. We may call this political authority or public power. The other involves the control over other resources which may be called influence or private power. Crosscutting both types of power are the use aspects of public and private power. Power may either be used or not used.

3. As well as defining the resources of power, the value system defines the use or nonuse of power. Put in another way, the ideas that define the resources of power can set the limits of power. If we say that we are discovering power only when it is being used, we are biasing our analysis toward the more legislative aspects of power. Accent on the limit-setting abilities of power reveals the status-quo maintenance which is found in any social unit. The value system of any social unit defines the relative strength of authority compared with influence as well as the way in which each type of power is activated or not activated.

4. Those at the apex of community power structure need not always be successful in working their will in order to prove their powerfulness. Although failure of power may often involve contesting power, it can also reveal the internal motivations of the initiating power. As is true of the use of power, the success or failure of power is often delimited by the body of controlling values which define how power should be used.



5. As a form of social organization in modern, industrial society, the community is the locus of major social activities which function at the national level. Since the community is the locus of more comprehensive power and since it is subject to power external to itself, the analysis of community power may not discover the major sources of community maintenance and change.

Although the present analysis has emphasized the purely conceptual side of community power studies, the Peoria community has offered substantive illustrations which appear valid not only for Peoria but for other American communities of its size as well. The more general truth of these substantive statements await wider comparative treatment. The propositions derived from the Peoria experience show that the major tension in the middle-sized community involves the relation of public and private power. The question of the degree of legitimacy of public power relative to private power is the central substantive question in the analysis of power on the American scene. We are presented in Peoria with the rather startling paradox that public power, although constitutionally legitimate, is evaluatively illegitimate and private power, although constitutionally illegitimate, is evaluatively legitimate. Some of the following statements attempt to deal with the aspects of this paradox.

1. Public power is not valued as a primary source of social endeavor.

The pursuit of private economic advancement is the major source of social valuation .

2. The power that derives from economic enterprise does not recognize the degree of its potential influence. Avowal of its influence would require greater public justification of its power position which may upset the claims of economic power to status and wealth.



3. The use of power by the economic elite usually involves all-rewarding activities which, by their very nature, justify elite claims to status and present a satisfactory public image. Since the major community orientation of the economic elite involves the selling of products, business creates and reenforces the idea of the benevolent producer and dispenser of needed goods and services. Using power for basic social change must always hurt certain established routines. This explains the economic elite's aversion to controversy.
4. The largest businesses with the greatest political resources, e.g., the tractor company in Peoria employing 20,000 people and netting millions of dollars, have national markets and national problems. Therefore, although business power relative to city government is enormous, its political activity relative to potential influence is negligible.
5. When, as rarely occurs, business is fully mobilized for use of power in a potentially controversial issue, its involvement is sporadic and unorganized. This is a result of the devaluation of power, the attendant ignorance as to its use, and the fundamentally private orientation of influence toward its place in the community.
6. The political implications of unconscious and inactive influence are widespread. The major result is that the predispositions of the community are toward maintaining the status quo. With a weak polity and irresponsible influence, rational change of the system from internal sources is highly unlikely.
7. Since the activities of elected officials are devalued, we find a striking disparity between political authority and status. The lot

of an elected politician is dangerous, unsavory, and transient and is extremely prone to safety and caution. This is especially true of communities of smaller size like Peoria where uncertain tenure and small pay draw few men of talent and social possibility into politics.

8. The business orientation toward government sees government as a purveyor of services not profitably supplied in the marketplace. Thus, even if the politicians were of broader vision, the resources and lay backing necessary for basic changes are absent.
9. Since the power of influence is greater than the power of authority, there are strong predispositions in the system for public power to be weak, indecisive, and subject to influence.
10. Conservative business and conservative politics limit the possibilities of the growth of innovative roles in the community. The ongoing process of professionalization in the economy and the polity show some signs of producing roles which may throw new ideas into the system.

It has been a major contention of the present work that the community is changing from a political system where the economic competition of the marketplace described governmental activities to one where the professional administration of municipal services is dominant. The "market" government is characterized by the presence of what Dahl has called "ex-plebes" acting in the interest of small constituencies for the purpose of maintaining political office. Although aspects of the older system of government remain, the new government is characterized by middle-class politicians, who often have other occupations, and whose primary interest may not be politics. This government considers itself the representative of citizens in general rather than local,



neighborhood or ethnic groupings and emphasizes more universal standards of efficiency, rationality, and honesty. The city manager represents the fountain-head of the "new politics", but its major predispositions would probably be found even without this formal representation. The modern government is the result of changes occurring on the American scene as a whole, changes from a production-oriented economy dominated by low-skilled immigrants to a more bureaucratized distribution-oriented economy dominated by the new middle class of technicians, clerks, managers, and professionals. Whereas before, politics was an activity apart, scorned and run by representatives of the poor, it is now an activity less scorned, still not completely respectable and run by the middle class. Government used to be an entity periodically cleaned up by "good citizens" with business backing. After each clean-up, the reign of the "politicians" would slowly reassert its accustomed place. Now there are signs that government is becoming similar to business except that it dispenses different services than does business. In neither case does government become an entity fully defined and utilized in its own terms, in terms of the public interest. While the older politics exchanges power for private rewards and the newer politics delimits power by professional administration, neither type creates or facilitates the use of power for basic community change. In fact, our analysis of the reform periods of Peoria and Springfield demonstrates how change from "corruption" to "honesty" and "efficiency" creates a government which will do little but do well and which stabilizes the status quo maintenance aspect of the political system.

We must ask what factors would be necessary for power to do more than traditional community maintenance. At least three major factors are relevant for basic community change by means of political action. All three are interdependent and include:



1. social theory
2. ideology
3. political organization

An adequate social theory is logically and sociologically prior to ideology while both are prior to political organization. Social theory includes a body of ideas presenting a view of reality and the way it is experienced. In most communities, one does not find explicit social theory concerning what the community is and how it runs. In a strict sense, ideology refers to the ideal state to which social theory about the community strives. When the community is conceived by its citizens as being perfect as it stands, then ideology and social theory embody the same set of ideas. When there is a conceived divergence between what is and what should be, then ideology creates and affirms the utopian community of the future. A subsequent result of the presence of social theory and ideology is the growth of an organization which will take power for the sake of ideological affirmation.


The greatest lack in the American community is its absence of utopian ideology, especially when it is recognized that the present is rife with problems. Yet those who speak in the name of the community see none of these problems and disseminate an image of its present perfection. The purveyors of opinion, the local newspaper, radio, the advertisers, and the association of commerce sentimentalize the present state of the community. When, in exceptional cases, problems of housing, downtown, or race relations are mentioned, they are conceived as evils adventitiously clinging to a sound community rather than intrinsically connected to it. The absence of political program for the future results from an almost complete paucity of ideas which analyze the



present in the light of the future. If one asks even the articulate citizen what he hopes or expects the community to be in ten years, all that will be conjured up is more of the same. At best, life will offer more things to more people. Interviews with candidates for political office reveal a dearth of ideas regarding what they plan to do if they are elected. Given this state of affairs, it is not surprising that government, at worst, is an economic marketplace, and, at best, is a nonpolitical, efficiency organization. With no ideas to move the system, one can expect no basic confrontation of community
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problems.


Not only are there few ideas to facilitate programmatic political organization, but the present organization, as one of its essential features, has the desire to keep politics away from firm organizational support. With its emphasis on nonpartisan elections as a force to limit the importance of local groupings who may want power (for good or for bad purposes), government is assured of its continuance as a popular myth reenforcer. Reform, by destroying political organization because it is corrupt, ends by eschewing political organization in general. This had led to another vital paradox in the community political system. Compared to most modern social entities, what is surprising about the community as a social system is its lack of organization. Contrary to Hunter's assertion that the community is a fully integrated social system with a rational oligarchy at its apex, the Peoria community suffers from an absence of social integration and its attendant control. The constitutional controllers of the community, its formally elected officials, are fragmented,
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It is possible that most of these statements apply more to middle-sized and small communities than to the large metropolis. The possible differences between them are most worthy of further research.




lacking in organizational support, and fearful compared to leaders of other social entities. Perhaps nowhere does the picture of the unknown, vague but tyrannical majority exercise more sway over leaders than in the community political system. Government officials are in organizational position and outlook subject to the putative whims of the public and lacking in support for independent and autonomous judgment. On the other hand, those leaders of well-organized and powerful private institutions found in the community could, through adhesion, exert much control and affect many changes, but through commitment to values which result in ignorance and apathy, they facilitate the community to continue as an entity which is not politically organized.

The failure of adequate definition of the community is as much the result of facts at the local level as it is of the analytic inadequacies of social research. Some of the major requirements of demarcating social units are social organization of roles and integration of leadership roles within the organization. These requirements are missing in what has heretofore been called the community level of analysis. The analysis of community power structure suffers from the fact that the community is not a fully established form of social organization. Lacking social definition of itself, lacking leadership which directs and defines its relation to itself and to the outside world, subject to rhetorical sentimentality, provincialism, and mass apathy, controlled by outside forces of which it is often ignorant, the community is a locus where people "live, work, and play", but not a focus of organized social life. It is for these reasons that the community can plan its orderly change only when it defines itself as an entity worthy of concern, organization and leadership. It appears unlikely that cities like Peoria can do this without the stimulation of outside forces acting in its name.



In conclusion, this has been a study in ideas, the ideas defining and surrounding the concept of power. Since power itself represents a configuration of socially accepted ideas, it is what society or the community thinks it is which tells the observer who has power and how power is used. Men's actions are best understood by the attitudes and beliefs which embody them. Even where one expects to find the naked hand of force working uncluttered by the sanctioned limitations of accepted edicts, one in fact discovers social conceptions agreed upon, circumscribing and defining the actual conduct of power. It is a commonplace that even an hereditary despot rules because there is a certain body of ideas which his tyrannized people accept as valid and binding. In like manner, in our communities, it is not only the fear of force that puts certain men in power, but the alliance of the leader and the led in their consensus about who should lead and how they should lead. The more these ideas are unquestioned, the less need there is for those who lead to use punishment to defend them. If a society has dual systems of ideas, one weak system which defines the valid use of power and the other stronger system which denigrates power and its workings, then it is possible that men may lead by their ability to embody ideas which abdicate power itself. In a community like this, the leaders can lead by setting the example as men who renounce power for the sake of more important things. Moreover, if in general these other things are also accepted as more important by the led, then those who overtly represent the institutions of power may themselves denigrate or circumscribe it as a dangerous and potentially malevolent instrument. To understand power, then, we must know how it is valued relative to other values, who values it, and how widely accepted are the ideas of valuation.



APPENDIX

General Methodological Considerations

Within the whole rubric of social science research, perhaps nothing has been more underrated in importance than the problem of the initial preconceptions by which research is directed. The modern nominalist orientation toward definitional problems not only undermines the possibility of having absolute standards of rightness for definitions but often leads toward eschewing the problem of the implicit assumptions of research altogether. The only standards become those which are believed to forward progress toward the solution of present theoretical problems. In this sense, the "goodness" of definitions depends upon the standards relative to a particular scientific tradition operating in a specific historical period. The entire body of definitions that makes up ones view of the world, by definition, limits that view. The quest for knowledge must be extremely conscious of the kaleidoscope of conception by which it is possible to look at phenomena, or else a sterile form of parochialism is inevitable. What are generally considered some of the major breakthroughs in modern science have often been the result of change in perspective and not the result of new evidence. Thus, a neglect of definitional problems in social science can only be considered as a potential index of parochial sterility. When the quest for knowledge is indifferent to its basic conceptions, we may be certain that it is implicitly imprisoned by its preconceptions.

The procedures of social science analysis may be broken down into three general stages. The first is the conceptual or definitional stage, the second is the theoretical stage, and the third is the testing stage. In the conceptual stage, the general conceptual outlook which guides the formation of theory is laid out. Here problems of the empirical content of concepts are discussed and the logical connections of concepts in a general framework are constructed.



The logical derivatives of the conceptual scheme are then developed into propositions. These propositions, which are statements connecting two or more concepts derived from the overall framework, are what may properly be called theory. Theory is to be validated or invalidated by test. The methods developed to test the theory involve the final stage of research. An overemphasis on any one of these processes at the expense of others will necessarily lead to some imbalance in the level of development of knowledge in an empirical discipline. A purely formal discipline like mathematics, of course, stresses only one part of the overall process. But an empirical discipline like sociology or political science must give proper emphasis to all parts of the analytic process.

The professional demands on publication have led sociology and possibly other disciplines to exert undue influence on the testing aspect of analysis. To become a professional, one need often only learn a body of established techniques which assure the "objectivity" of the evidence collected. Moreover, once the techniques are learned, reaffirmation of professional status through publication is confirmed through repetitive application of such techniques. One cannot aver, however, that such testing is devoid of theoretical implications since quite obviously it is propositions that are being tested. However, the theoretical questions to be asked often do not derive from an explicit framework, but from an implicit body of questions which have been traditionally asked. The truth of this assertion is quite apparent if one asks why certain sociologists ask certain theoretical questions. They ask these questions not because they are important to fill in the gaps of an existing framework, but because other sociologists using similar data collecting techniques are asking similar questions. The overemphasis on technique rather than classification



has led much of sociology to believe that what is needed for scientific progress is more and better data. If, however, general conceptual problems have been neglected for the sake of data validation, it is time to clarify things we already know as well as to attempt to collect more evidence.

In the field of community power, a clarification of general concepts ✓ to guide research is a stark necessity. Conflicts and contradictions which are argued on the basis of differences in evidence are often the result of differences in preconception. By expostulating about these conflicts and by drawing upon data from a field study of Peoria, Illinois, we attempted in this monograph to clarify and reformulate some of the concepts which will be useful for continuing research in the problem of community power.

Power Structure Methodology

Two rather distinct and somewhat contradictory approaches had arisen to examine the problem of community power. These may roughly be called the pyramidal conception of community power as counterposed to the pluralist conception. The foremost exponent of the former conception is the work of Floyd Hunter whereas the latter conception is best exemplified in the work of Robert Dahl and his followers. It was our contention that the methodology, the theory, and the research tools forged by these opposing schools were in need of critical appraisal.

Methodology refers to the general mental processes and conceptual outlooks which embody the questions that lie behind any distinct approach to phenomena. As a rule, these must be gleaned from implication since most analytic frameworks are not explicit about their methodological underpinnings. According to commonly accepted tradition, methodology differs from technique which refers to the instruments utilized in the collection of data.

There are three conceptions central to the study of community power and each of them receives variable emphasis in the two main approaches. These three conceptions are power, community, and issue.

The problem of power has been the traditional concern of political science. The concrete social realm in which this has been studied is the government. Up to the present time, political science often defines itself as a discipline which investigates the specific aspect of social activities which occur in or have effect upon formal government. Although the study of power as it occurs in government is certainly a worthwhile endeavor, methodological difficulties arise when power is seen as coterminous with government. Dealing with power only as it occurs in formal governmental machinery often leads, however inadvertently, to the notion that this is the only place that power resides. A growing number of social scientists have completely undermined the traditional conception even while its sway over their thinking remains. The word political reflects these dual tendencies in the ambiguous ways in which it is used. On the one hand political is used to refer to the workings of one concrete sphere of social structure and on the other hand it is used to refer to an analytic way of looking at all concrete spheres. This latter is the newer meaning and undoubtedly the one which will increasingly be used in the future and for obvious reasons. Government is not the only locus of power. Indeed, power is present in all human relationships and, therefore, the concept power must be a strictly analytic tool focusing upon its workings in all social action. In this sense, power is on the same methodological level as terms like economic, normative, or affective. Thus, power as a conceptual posture reflects upon an aspect of the total social process.



In line with the modern sociological tradition, power is, then, a constant feature of all social life. Moreover, the question of whether power is really pyramidal or really pluralist never arises in this tradition since power is assumed to be involved in the stratification aspects of enduring institutions and groups. The contours of the power figure, how well integrated it is, the resources which define its apex, and the values which define its activities or lack of them are problems to be approached empirically, but the stratificational organization of power is an assumption commonly accepted, highly productive theoretically, and usually used even by those who are not explicit about their initial preconceptions. The question of who really has power is ontological and unnecessary since power is already assumed as an aspect of all enduring social relationships. Moreover, it is not considered necessary to be concerned about whether science involves preconceptions or not, but only about the kind of preconceptions which are most fruitful to the construction of testable theory. In the case of power, the convention to treat it as an analytic tool, focusing upon the stratificational aspects of influence and control in any social system follows the line of inquiry most germane to systematic theoretical results.

It is in their conception of community, or better in their lack of it, that both the Hunter and Dahl approaches fall short of methodological precision. In the study of power in concrete social systems (like the community, the family, the nation) it is necessary to define as precisely as possible the concrete unit under analysis. Only in this manner can one delineate which structure of power is the power of the unit being studied and which structure is part of another unit. For example, in the case of the community, we must be assured that the type of pyramid of power discovered in it is not simply in it in a



geographic sense, but is of it in a sociological sense. If one finds certain types of power hierarchies in a community context, how do we know that it is the power structure of that community? Neither pluralism nor pyramidism deal with this problem but act as if the intrinsic connection between the power analyzed and the community in which it was discovered were self-evident. This lack of explicit conception of community results, as usual, in implicit conceptions which predispose the thinkers toward different results. Then much conflict and verbiage between these two schools is wasted on the problem of differences in empirical results which should have been spent on clearing up their differences in methodology. It is our contention that a clear delineation of the community context is one of the most pressing needs of community power structure.

Concerning the third major conception of community power studies, that of issues, it is here that Dahl and his followers have made the most significant methodological advances over the earlier work of Hunter. The pluralists quite rightly claim that Hunter never demonstrates power as it works. The reason for this lack is stated by Hunter in his initial assumption that reputation is the measure of power. It does seem clear that, in many cases, the existence of power cannot be separated from its execution. Thus, focusing upon concrete decisions can lead one to the locus of those who make them. Lack of emphasis on this problem may well lead to significant gaps in our knowledge of community power. Moreover, if one distinguishes the structure of power from the processes of power, the emphasis on issues adds significantly to the latter concern.

The realization that concrete issues are important is only half the battle. As in the question of the conception of community, it is necessary to specify the level of generality of the concept concerned. There are issues in all con-

crete social units and if one is interested in community power, issues at the community level must be defined. One cannot define issue only by the operations used to discover them, for then one loses the connection of data to general conceptions. Moreover, this lack of explicitness about the level of generality of issues gives the problem a high degree of arbitrariness. The pluralists, for example, appear to define issue by "what is going on" at the conscious level at the time at which they are studying the community. Given this arbitrariness, it is quite logical to expect different people to be found in different issues. Indeed, in another year in another city, one would expect another varying roster of decision-makers. Moreover, the emphasis on decision-makers as a series of individual persons rather than as roles representing enduring groups adds to the conclusion that power is fragmented and pluralist.

Theory

Theory refers to the substantive propositions derived from the general conceptual scheme. The word substantive in this definition emphasizes the feature of empirical testability of such propositions. "Good" theory is usually inseparable from the operations involved in testing it although theory without adequate testing procedures has often been "good" if it leads to formulation of important theoretical insights. Moreover, some theory may preclude the possibility of being tested with "hard" data and this fact in itself does not abrogate the "goodness" of such theory.

In the case of Hunter the general features of his theory ask essentially structural rather than procedural questions. That is, Hunter's substantive propositions relate the structure of power to general institutional configurations in the community. His main theoretical contention can be stated in this



way: Community power is lodged in a small clique of people whose power is based on their positions at the top of significant institutional configurations. The major theoretical problem of Hunter's work, which has already been alluded to, revolves more around what he did not test. He did not test any propositions about power in execution. Moreover, one of his major assumptions is, according to Dahl and his followers, open to question and, therefore, should be stated at the theoretical level. This is the assumption of an intrinsic connection between *repute* and power. Dahlists have claimed that this cannot be taken as self-evident and must be proved.

Pluralist theory revolves around the connection of concrete decisions to concrete individual decision-makers. It emphasizes the procedural aspects of power more than does Hunter. Since the main pluralist desire is to test whether power is pyramidal or not, the problem is already solved by its initial concepts. Arbitrarily defined power executing arbitrarily defined issues in an arbitrarily defined community must and does lead to an amorphous, unstructured power system. For example, it is quite possible that the discovery of pluralists that issues each have their own pyramid is correct empirically, but the really curious theoretical problem is why pluralism is not somewhat surprised by this finding. The question of power interrelates theoretically with the question of social integration. If it is discovered that a system is characterized by a multitude of detached stratified power pyramids, then what holds the system together? This would immediately bring up the question of underlying value integration and who controls the values. Theory is only as strong as the logical and empirical consistency of the concepts that make it up and in this case, the methodological substructure is too weak to bear the load of strong theory.

Research Method

Research method is the body of techniques which are utilized to validate or invalidate the theory. The type of method which is used varies with the demands of the theory being tested. However, the claims of precision require, if at all possible, those methods which approach controlled, laboratory, conditions. In social science, data verification has increasingly relied upon controlled statistical sampling and precise interviewing techniques. If the problems involved in data collection make adherence to the highest research standards impossible, the methods used must be adapted to the exigencies of the research situation. It is well accepted that method should follow theoretical interest in any science and if only "soft" methods appear workable, then research must get along with what it has.

The Hunter method is what may be called *repute sociometry*. After choosing a number of highly reputable people in the community, he then asks each of them who they believe to be powerful. He then maps out the names as they appear in increasing frequency and calls them the ruling elite of the community. Undoubtedly, there is good reason behind this approach. Probably no one is as likely to know "who runs what" better than highly prestigious persons. However, peoples' memories are short and choosing a discrete number of individuals abjures the probability of a wide variety of power figures turning up.

Pluralism, rather than going from people of *repute* to people of *power*, begins with concrete decisions and traces them to concrete decision-makers. Whereas Hunter studies power potential, pluralism attempts to delineate power in action. But by choosing issues with no theoretical reasons behind the choice and by accenting individual decision-makers, one is inevitably led to the "pluralist alternative". Method cannot do what theory does not require it to do.

It appeared then that research on community power had to strengthen the strong points of both the Dahl and Hunter approaches. Rather than seeing these schools as conflicting in substantive conclusions, it appears that they were taking different roads leading them to different places. Only by re-routing could we utilize the fruits of both approaches. The following assumptions were made a part of the initial underpinning of the present research.

1. Power is a constant feature of any social system. It is found in all social units and groupings, sometimes organized and sometimes not.
2. Power is most clearly discernible as it is institutionalized in organized social groups. A person has power not in any individual capacity, but derives it from representing powerful groups.
3. Any definition of community as an empirically defined entity is unduly restrictive at this stage of research. Therefore, the theoretical propositions about community power must carefully separate power of the community from power in the community which may be part of other social units. However, results about power in the community will still fill quite important gaps in our knowledge.
4. Research must be aware that issue analysis may arrive at only half the equation of power--that involved in the execution of decisions. The other half of the power equation investigates the manner by which the political system may operate to limit potential problems from turning into issues.
5. As far as method is concerned, both the Hunter and Dahl types were utilized. Therefore, in the present research, the structure of power through reputative sociometry and the structure and process of decision-making through issue innovation and resolution were investigated.

The approach to the problem of community power taken by this monograph was somewhat unorthodox, but represents what the author considers a prime necessity in social science research. Rather than accepting the present body of theoretical questions as a system from which to deduce and test new theory, this research addressed itself to the saliency of the original questions themselves. A critical appraisal of concepts like power was made in order to discover the limitations, both logical and empirical, intrinsic to contemporary approaches to the problem. By asking what kinds of data and what kinds of questions are implicitly or explicitly denied by both the Hunter and Dahl approaches, one can arrive at dimensions of power which are more comprehensive than either of the prevailing schools. The use of data was then interwoven with these newer conceptions to attempt to understand their applicability to concrete empirical situations. In this way, data is used illustratively to broaden conception and to create theory rather than to test theory. Wider application of concepts and more precise test of theory will hopefully result from this exercise.





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